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Abbreviations and definitions 
bcm – billion cubic metres 
bcm/year – billion cubic metres per year 
tcm – thousand cubic metres 
$/tcm – USD per thousand cubic metres 
bn – billion 
bn/year – billion per year 
NPV – net present value, calculated assuming 10% discount rate 
mmBTU – million British Thermal Units 
$/mmBTU – USD per million British Thermal Units 
bbl – barrel of crude oil 
$/bbl – USD per barrel of crude oil 
VMF – vertical market failure 
LTC – long-term contract 
Conversion factors  
$/mmBTU = 0.0272*$/tcm 
Disclaimer  
The purpose of examining multiple market and non-market scenarios is to conduct 
‘stress tests’ for the two possible gas sales strategies. The scenarios examined are not 
predictions. Whenever possible, we devised these scenarios to be as close as possible 
to the industry’s expected possible paths of future gas market developments. 
However, these scenarios are not intended to replicate possible market 
developments; some may be hypothetical and do not necessarily conform to the 
current established view of the future of the gas markets. For example, one scenario 
is Qatar’s removal of the exploration moratorium and the further expansion of its 
production capacity; this may not be realistic given the current environment of low 
oil and gas prices. Nevertheless, this scenario has a positive probability of occurring, 
making it a form of ‘high-impact, low-probability event’. Our intention is to test the 
robustness of hydrocarbon producers’ sales strategies in an uncertain world and not 
to provide ‘price forecast’-type analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The European gas industry has undergone dramatic changes in the last ten years, 
and the traditional business model for monetising gas resources – quasi-vertical 
integration between buyers and sellers using a series of large and long-term contracts 
(LTCs) to trade gas and finance both transmission and production facilities – seems 
no longer fit for purpose. The aim of this research is (i) to explain why the traditional 
business model is not appropriate and may be detrimental for major gas producers 
and (ii) to quantify the costs and benefits of the different strategies available to 
sellers in the new gas market reality that is emerging in Europe. We analyse these 
issues by looking at the strategic responses available to Gazprom, Russia’s state-
owned gas producer and the largest supplier to Europe. This is a particularly 
interesting case study that deserves our attention for several reasons.  
The ongoing structural changes in the European and global oil and gas market 
environment have motivated Gazprom to rethink its export strategy. Gazprom has 
announced several proposals in the past, and in the last two years in particular, of 
which one represents the most radical change since the inception of gas exports from 
the Soviet Union to Europe.2 In the aftermath of the decision to cancel the South 
Stream pipeline project, which was supposed to run from Russia to Bulgaria and 
onwards to Europe, Gazprom stated that it was considering changing its traditional 
sales strategy in Europe from ‘from wellhead to burner tip’ to the ‘border’ sales 
strategy. In particular, according to an official speech made by Gazprom’s CEO 
(Miller, 2015), the proposed border sales strategy would build pipelines to the EU 
border, from which European gas importers (Gazprom’s clients) would build missing 
pipelines and transport gas to European markets. The implications of this change in 
strategy for Gazprom’s business model are: (i) a retreat to the external EU border, (ii) 
limited or no participation in wholesale trading, (iii) passive or no engagement with 
end customers in Europe and, hence, (iv) increasing dependence on market 
dynamics without the ability to actively price Gazprom gas in traded markets. Put 
differently, Gazprom may be transformed into a pure commodity producer, focusing 
on the upstream segment of the gas value chain only. In the rest of this paper, we 
show that this strategy is detrimental for hydrocarbon producers selling their 
commodities in liberalised markets in general and for Gazprom’s own position in 
Europe in particular. The analysis of Gazprom’s sales strategies deserves our 
attention for two main reasons. Firstly, in terms of the market, Gazprom is the 
largest gas reserve holder in the world and is one of dominant suppliers to Europe, 
supplying roughly one third of the entire market. Hence, any drastic changes in its 
sales and investment strategy will affect the gas market structure in Europe for 
decades to come (see e.g. EC DG Energy’s letter regarding the cancellation of the 
South Stream project to the head of ENTSOG3). Secondly, in terms of policy, 
                                                          
2 Media and trade press have discussed these proposals extensively. 
3 The letter is available here: 
http://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/TYNDP/2015/COM_20150227_Ares97524
1SouthStream.pdf, accessed 15 April 2015 
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Gazprom’s sales strategy affects the way in which European energy policy will 
develop, not only because of the importance of gas in the energy mix of the region 
and national security considerations but also for the revenue it brings to the Russian 
state budget. 
Aside from the significance of this case study for the current energy policy debate in 
Europe (and other regions facing similar dilemmas), the general question of which 
business model and sale strategy hydrocarbon producers should pursue in liberalised 
and uncertain markets is perhaps the most important dilemma that such producers 
face. Based on the vertical value chain of the oil and gas industry, at least two 
business models can be distinguished: (i) pure production and (ii) integrated 
production, supply, trading and marketing (ISTM). As the name suggests, the second 
model is a strategy that tries to capture the whole value chain; it is also commonly 
referred to as the integrated oil and gas business model, whereby producers 
participate in activities further downstream, such as wholesale trading, processing, 
transportation, logistics, storage and direct sales and marketing. It is important to 
note the different roles that trading and marketing functions play within the overall 
organisational structure of hydrocarbon producers and their contribution to 
generating sales, revenue and profit. For example, a midstream company (utility 
company) may see the trading function as supplemental to its main activity – 
marketing final energy products – and hence use wholesale trading to hedge their 
downstream (main) position. By contrast, upstream producers tend to see trading 
functionality as a means of hedging their produced commodity and marketing 
activity as a means of hedging and supporting their trading business. The pure 
production strategy focuses instead on production specialisation, and pure producers 
do not engage in wholesale trading. Gazprom’s proposed border sales strategy can be 
regarded as a pure production model.  
In general, the degree of downstream participation varies from one oil and gas 
producer to another, depending on their competitive advantages, produced 
commodities (oil or gas or both), organisational culture, history and values. At one 
end of this spectrum are companies such as BP (with its renowned Integrated Supply 
and Trading division) Shell, Total, Statoil, BG Group, GasTerra and ENI, which 
actively participate in wholesale gas trading. At the other end are pure producers 
such as Sonatrach, Anadarko, Apache, BHP Billiton, Marathon Oil and Woodside, 
which have limited or indeed no wholesale gas trading and direct sales and 
marketing interests. Somewhere between these two extremes are companies such as 
ExxonMobil, Chevron and Gazprom, which have established gas trading and 
marketing activities that are rather limited in scale and scope. Note that this list is 
not conclusive: it is not our aim to provide an exhaustive listing and categorising of 
all oil and gas companies in terms of their degree of vertical integration and business 
strategies. Instead, these companies serve as examples and are listed in no particular 
order. This list is also based on the gas value chain and would therefore be different 
for the oil value chain. 
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The choice of business strategy along these two extremes – pure production versus 
ISTM business models – is not straightforward. There is ongoing debate in the 
management and strategy literature over the appropriate sales strategy for producers 
of commodities such as oil, gas and coal in changing and complex (liberalised) 
markets. For example, Kose et al. (2013) analysed thermal coal production in Asia 
Pacific in an oversupply environment and concluded that coal producers can increase 
profitability and reduce earnings volatility by expanding their activities downstream 
into trading, marketing and logistics. Similarly, Himona et al. (2014) analysed 
whether international oil companies (IOCs) should disintegrate and concluded that 
they should remain integrated; in particular, physical trading was found to 
contribute 7-8% of IOCs’ downstream profit and physical trade was identified as a 
‘glue’ that binds all value chain parts of the oil industry, allowing IOCs to optimise 
and enjoy integration benefits. Corsini et al. (2013) stressed the importance of 
trading and portfolio optimisation when markets are complex and liberalised. The 
report looked at possible strategies for European gas buyers (‘midstreamers’) in 
liberalised markets and discussed the importance of trading and portfolio effects for 
midstreamer profitability rather than relying on the business cases of individual 
contracts. By contrast, Forrest et al. (2011) championed the idea that specialisation is 
the future and that integrated oil and gas market players (producers that are 
integrated with supply, trading and marketing functions) have lower effective stock 
prices4 than pure upstream (or pure downstream) players and are less incentivised to 
develop reserves than pure producers. 
Our research aims to contribute to this management and strategy debate. 
Furthermore, to our knowledge, a systematic quantification of the costs and benefits 
of these business strategies has not yet been attempted in the academic literature on 
energy economics. The costs and benefits for oil and gas producers should be judged 
on a case-by-case basis; however, in general it has been suggested that the integrated 
oil and gas business model is less risky than the pure upstream or downstream 
models (Forrest et al., 2011). This is primarily because downstream participation is a 
natural hedge for upstream players when commodity prices fall (Sheppard, 2015; 
Zhdannikov and Bousso, 2015; Mercatus Energy Advisers, 2014). However, such 
hedging comes at a price for oil and gas producers: according to Forrest et al. (2011), 
the effective stock price and reserve-replacement ratio for integrated players are 
lower than for ‘focused’ players. This is not surprising as holding an option has a 
price. Other benefits of downstream participation for oil and gas producers include 
flexibility and portfolio effects (see Kose et al., 2013; Corsini et al., 2013) as well as 
market intelligence (Sheppard, 2015; Dison, 2011). In this regard, integrated players, 
having better market understanding that stems directly from participating in 
wholesale trading, are able to behave strategically by not developing reserves as 
quickly as may be expected in a competitive market or as fast as pure upstream 
producers would do. Pure producers can therefore be seen as price-takers, and, 
                                                          
4 Measured in Forrest et al. (2011) as EV/EBITDA. 
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hence, they tend to focus on optimising their cost side and upstream performance 
rather than exploiting market opportunities and engage in active price setting in 
addition to standard cost optimisation. Indeed, the transaction cost economics 
perspective suggests that one of the rationales for downstream integration by 
upstream producers is to ‘exploit market power and raising barriers to entry’ (see e.g. 
Stuckey and White, 1993), and this has traditionally been done via bilateral 
bargaining and LTCs between gas buyers and sellers in the absence of spot trading. 
However, when downstream gas markets are liquid and liberalised, the ability to 
exploit pricing power optimally is only possible when producers participate actively 
at the wholesale trading level, giving them more accurate information about market 
dynamics and allowing for better pricing strategies. Note that this argument may not 
necessarily be applicable to the crude oil market and the exploitation of market 
power by large oil producers. This is because the oil market is so liquid and deep, 
with an extremely competitive shipping market, making oil trading less logistically 
challenging. Hence, market intelligence is not particularly important for oil 
producers to exercise their pricing power. By contrast, to even exploit price arbitrage 
in the European pipeline gas market, gas players must have excellent understanding 
of local commodity markets and regulatory regimes as well as transport capacity 
markets and these have to be coordinated activities. Thus, we argue in this paper 
(with empirical evidence) that exploitation of gas price arbitrage and pricing power 
can only be achieved with the ISTM business model. This is another contribution of 
this research to the literature on energy economics. Almost all research papers on gas 
market modelling (amongst others, see, e.g., Zwart and Mulder, 2006, Holz et al., 
2008, Lise and Hobbs, 2008, Gabriel et al., 2012, Abada et al., 2013, Chyong and 
Hobbs, 2014, Growitsch et al., 2014), if they assume that some market participants 
have pricing power, would justify this choice based on rather simplistic view, such as 
by looking at the size of gas reserves that exporting countries have. 
The main conclusion of our research paper is that when a market is mature, with an 
increasing number of buyers, the best sales strategy for a large hydrocarbon producer 
should be based on flexibility and increased usage of market trading to maximise the 
value of its commodity. This suggests that an optimal export strategy for Gazprom 
should contain a substantial and increasing portion of uncommitted volumes that 
can be traded in markets (gas hubs), while the rest should be based on some form of 
bilateral forward contract with a minimum take-or-pay level to secure infrastructure 
finance, if needed. We explain these and other important findings in the rest of this 
paper, which is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the role of 
markets and long-term bilateral supply contracts in the coordination of economic 
exchanges between buyers and sellers. Section 3 discusses the evolution of the 
European gas industry and the rise and fall of bilateral LTCs in particular. Section 4 
looks at the different sales strategies available to gas producers in liberalised markets 
and examines how Statoil, the largest Norwegian gas producer, reacted to changing 
market conditions. Section 5 presents the results of quantifying the costs and 
benefits of the different strategies available for upstream firms in increasingly open 
and liberalised markets, using Gazprom’s potential sales strategy as a case study. 
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Finally, we discuss the results and policy implications in Section 6 and outline the 
main conclusions in Section 7. 
 
2. Coordinating economics exchanges: The role of contracts and 
markets 
The economic literature points out to two major organisational forms that support 
exchanges between economic agents: (i) markets and (ii) vertical integration. Of 
course, there is a continuum of organisational forms between those two extremes, 
including joint ventures and LTCs (quasi-vertical integration), and the choice of 
organisational form depends on the characteristics of the transaction in question. 
Choosing an organisational form to facilitate trade has long been at the heart of 
economic thinking, particularly within the transaction cost economics literature led 
by scholars such as Coase, Williamson, Klein and Goldberg (Coase, 1937; 1972; 
Williamson, 1971; 1975; 1979; 1983; 1985; Klein et al., 1978; Klein, 1980; Goldberg, 
1976; Goldberg and Erickson, 1987) and others following a similar approach. Joskow 
(1985) summarises the basic theory behind the transaction cost approach by 
explaining the choice of governance structure: markets or long-term vertical 
relationships. In addition to the traditional costs elements usually incurred during 
any production process (such as land, labour, capital and materials), there are also 
transaction costs associated with the exchange of economic goods between agents; 
for example, costs relating to drafting, enforcing and potentially breaching contracts. 
These transaction costs are real economic costs that should be considered alongside 
traditional cost items in the cost-minimising decision-making problem. 
In general, there is a set of characteristics that may influence the nature and 
magnitude of transaction costs: (i) the uncertainty and complexity of transactions, 
(ii) the need for and degree of relationship-specific sunk investments to support 
transactions, (iii) the trade-off between the cost and benefit of internalisation versus 
reliance on market transactions and (iv) the regularity of transactions. Crucially, the 
need for and magnitude of relationship-specific investments to facilitate trade are the 
most important characteristics, which, in combination with the other factors 
mentioned, could give rise to very high transaction costs associated with potential 
exchanges. In particular, high uncertainty means that contracts may be incomplete, 
in the sense that they are unable to specify every possible state of nature that could 
affect the performance of the parties under the contract. As such, the incompleteness 
of contracts would not create significant problems were it not for the involvement of 
a high degree of relationship-specific assets that must be developed ex ante to 
facilitate the exchange. Furthermore, the frequency of transactions should only 
matter when high (sunk) investment costs were involved in establishing bilateral 
trade because subsequent transactions represent opportunities for haggling and the 
higher the frequency of those transactions, the higher the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour among the parties involved in the trade. According to Williamson (1983), 
9 
 
there are four types of asset specificity that may partition an industry into a smaller 
number of bilateral oligopolies:  
1. Site specificity – the vertical relationship is arranged such that related 
facilities are located close to one another; for example, to minimise transport 
and inventory costs. 
2. Physical asset specificity – appears when investments in equipment can only 
be utilised by one or both parties to the transaction and there is little value in 
utilising these assets in alternative ways.  
3. Human capital specificity – emerges when employees develop specific skills 
required for a particular transaction. 
4. Dedicated assets – arises when investments are made only to serve a specific 
transaction and would not have been developed otherwise; thus, should the 
contract underpinning the exchanges be terminated prematurely, the 
dedicated asset would be underutilised. 
A combination of vertical integration and LTCs is the preferred mode of organising 
trade when the numbers of buyers and sellers are effectively limited by a high degree 
of asset specificity coupled with a high frequency of transactions and capital 
intensity. For example, Stuckey and White (1993) outline the conditions under which 
vertical integration and LTCs are the preferred organisational form for economic 
agents to coordinate exchanges: 
1. existence of vertical market failure (VMF); 
2. presence of market power in adjacent stages; 
3. possibility to exploit market power and raise barriers to entry; 
4. response to industry life cycle (immature or declining markets).  
Of the above factors, the existence of market failure in vertical relationships strongly 
motivates economic agents to seek integration along the value chain as a means of 
organising exchanges. The most important and frequent reason for market failure in 
vertical relationships is a combination of a small number of buyer and sellers, a high 
degree of relationship-specific sunk investments involved in transactions and the 
high frequency with which such transactions occur. 
In an industry with a small number of participants, transaction terms – price and 
volumes – are determined by the balance of power between buyers and sellers, a 
balance that is unpredictable and unstable. Many markets appear to have numerous 
participants on each side; however, in reality they are composed of groups of bilateral 
oligopolists due to high switching costs. Here, the degree of asset specificity is 
important because once these investments are made, they turn the seemingly large 
number of buyers and sellers on both sides of the market into a bilateral monopoly or 
oligopoly situation, which is prone to ex post opportunistic behaviour on both sides 
of the transaction.  
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Furthermore, the problem of asset specificity is exacerbated if the asset is durable 
and intense. Highly capital-intensive investments exacerbate the losses arising from 
potential ex post hold-up situations, while the durability of assets (possibly coupled 
with frequent or repeated interactions) increases the time horizon over which the 
risks of such opportunism may arise. Thus, the primary reason for an effectively 
reduced number of buyers and sellers is that the specificity, durability and intensity 
of an asset raise switching costs to the point where only a small number of buyers are 
truly available to sellers and vice versa. 
Thus, to mitigate the risks of ex post opportunism arising from intense, durable and 
relationship-specific assets involved in such transactions, vertical and quasi-vertical 
integration would seem to be a solution (Stuckey and White, 1993). It appears that 
the degree of asset specificity is the most important characteristic influencing the risk 
of hold-ups. If an asset has a relatively low degree of relationship specificity and is 
less durable and intense, a standardised transaction or contract would suffice and 
there would be no need for LTCs or formal vertical integration to mitigate ex post 
opportunism since potential losses would be substantially lower.  
All of the factors that give rise to a high transaction cost structure were present at the 
beginning of the development of the natural gas industry in Europe and persisted 
until European authorities launched the liberalisation of the electricity and gas 
markets in Europe. As the transaction cost theory predicts, the European gas 
industry was developed based on a system of complex LTCs between buyers and 
sellers. However, as we argue in the next section, the rationale for LTCs in the 
European gas industry has vanished and companies should now adopt sales 
strategies in accordance with changes in the market structure, specifically, the 
number of buyers and sellers and the importance of specialised assets. 
 
3. The evolution of the European gas industry: From a system of 
bilateral contracts to market institutions 
The transaction cost framework discussed above is a helpful tool for understanding 
the evolution and organisational complexity of the natural gas trade in Europe. LTCs 
drove the development of the gas trade in Europe, and the first such contracts were 
signed between European companies to develop the gas reserves of the giant 
Groningen gas field in the Netherlands (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007).  
Consistent with the transaction cost framework, the rationale for setting up LTCs is 
to protect buyers and sellers from ex post opportunism arising from the highly asset-
specific, durable and capital-intense investments involved in: (i) the development of 
upstream production and gas treatment facilities, (ii) long-distance international 
pipelines and (iii) national transmission and distribution systems at the local level. 
This protection takes the form of agreed minimum payments to sellers irrespective of 
actual offtake by buyers – the so-called minimum take-or-pay level. Thus, the buyer 
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takes volume risks, whereas the seller agrees to settle the transaction at a price that is 
(slightly) below the price of competing fuels, which are usually oil products. The 
subsequent change in contract price is pegged to a basket of oil products and other 
competing fuel prices at the ‘burner tip’ (final markets); therefore, the seller takes 
price risks since he does not control the pricing of gas and relies on the pricing 
dynamics of competing fuels. This arrangement ensures that gas stays competitive 
with other fuels in an environment when there is no gas-to-gas competition. 
Furthermore, the pricing in such agreements is used as a mechanism to divide the 
rent associated with producing, transporting and marketing gas between sellers and 
buyers.5 
As such, the emergence and evolution of the natural gas trade in Europe fits neatly 
with the transaction cost economics framework. Table 1 outlines the main 
characteristics of the industry using transaction cost economics terminology. From 
this we can see that the two most important factors that constitute the foundation of 
LTCs supporting gas trade and investment in Europe are: (i) industry structure 
(number of buyers and sellers) and (ii) asset characteristics. The latter have changed 
dramatically over the past 20 years, and the rationale for and role of LTCs in the 
European gas trade has diminished significantly. The reasons for this decline are 
elaborated below. 
Table 1: Evolution of international gas trade: From LTCs to markets. 
 1970s 2000 2014 
Number of sellers 16 34 48 
Number of buyers 18 56 71 
Asset characteristics: 
Specificity High High/moderate Moderate/low 
 
Intensity 
 
Upstream: high 
Midstream and 
downstream: high 
 
Upstream: high/moderate 
Midstream and downstream: 
high/moderate 
 
Durability 
 
20+ years 
 
Transaction frequency 
 
High 
 
Uncertainty 
 
High 
Vertical coordination 
mechanism 
Most transactions via 
vertical integration and 
LTCs 
Half of transactions 
conducted on spot markets 
Notes: Numbers of sellers and buyers (in brackets) are based on counts of gas-exporting and -
importing countries provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its 2015 Natural Gas 
Information report (IEA, 2015a). 
Source: Author’s assessment. 
                                                          
5 On using LTCs to distribute the gains from trade between contracting parties see Masten, S. and 
Croker, K. 1985; Crocker, K. and Masten, S. 1988; Mulherin, J.H., 1986. 
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3.1. European gas industry structure: From bilateral oligopolies to 
organised market trading 
The international gas trade has expanded dramatically since the early 1970s, when 
the industry structure was balanced with low number of gas-exporting and -
importing countries (16 sellers and 18 buyers). By 2000, these numbers had more 
than doubled to 34 gas exporters and 56 gas importers. By 2014, the market 
structure was dominated by sellers; the number of exporters had reached 48 while 
the number of buyers had increased to 71 (IEA, 2015a). 
We could argue that overall, the market has witnessed a dramatic increase in the 
total number of participants. Traditionally, the gas markets have been regional in 
nature, reflecting large-scale infrastructure investments along the whole value chain 
and the capital requirements to build transport pipeline networks to supply gas to 
end consumers in particular. This means that the effective number of trading 
partners in each of the regional markets – North America, Europe and Asia – is in 
fact substantially lower. However, these regional markets have become increasingly 
linked by gas trade via seaborne routes, using liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels to 
trade gas over greater distances. From the late 1960s until the mid 2000s, there was 
a general trend of cost reduction due to technological improvements across the whole 
LNG value chain (Stern, 2006; Greaker and Sagen, 2008). This, coupled with 
demand uptake in remote consumption centres relative to production locations, 
allowed LNG to emerge as one of the fastest-growing internationally traded 
commodities over 1960–2014, when annual growth in LNG exports averaged 14% 
pa.6 Over this period, there was a proliferation of the number of LNG-exporting 
countries, starting with Algeria, the first LNG exporter: in 1975 there were only four 
exporters, whereas by 1995 this figure had reached eight, and by 2014 there were 20 
LNG exporters (including re-exports from Europe). Furthermore, and as we shall 
discuss below, LNG contracts are generally comparably smaller in terms of annual 
offtake quantity and shorter in duration than pipeline gas contracts. This suggests, 
among other things, that as it is more flexible in terms of transport mode, LNG trade 
is less asset specific than trade via pipelines. Therefore, the uptake in LNG trade not 
only increased the effective number of trading partners but also introduced more 
flexibility to both sides of the market. 
While the number of exporters and importers increased worldwide, market 
liberalisation and the ability to tap into global LNG markets meant that the number 
of buyers and sellers also increased in European gas markets, reflecting trade in 
organised market exchanges (gas hubs or spot markets). The liberalisation process 
began with the 1991 Gas Transit Directive, and the subsequent legal battle between 
European antitrust authorities and major exporters to remove destination clauses 
from long-term pipeline and LNG import contracts. This was followed by the first 
two energy packages (1996 and 2003) and then by the third energy package (2009). 
                                                          
6 Author’s calculation based on Poten and Partners LNG trade database, accessed through the 
Bloomberg Terminal. 
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In the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU antitrust authorities were successful in 
negotiations with exporters to remove the destination clauses from long-term LNG 
and pipeline gas contracts. These clauses were seen as major impediments to market 
competition in Europe as they prohibited importers from reselling gas to other 
market geographies and segments. The antitrust authorities then targeted the largest 
European gas importers, such as GDF Suez, ENI and E.ON, expressing concern that 
these companies used exclusive access to gas transportation facilities to effectively 
limit competition in their market areas. As a result, these companies reached 
agreement with the competition authorities to reduce their long-term capacity 
reservations (capacity release programmes were agreed between GDF Suez, Eni and 
E.ON) to allow new suppliers to enter the market (European Commission (EC), 
2009a; EC 2009b; EC 2010). At the same time, national antitrust authorities also 
looked into the state of market competition further downstream, including LTCs 
between second-tier suppliers and larger importers. For example, Germany’s 
national antitrust authority (BKartA) introduced limitations on contract duration 
and supply quotas for a period of three years (2007–2010) to enable more 
downstream competition by allowing second-tier buyers to switch suppliers 
(European Competition Network, 2010). As a result of this regulatory intervention, 
many second-tier suppliers, such as power generators and local distribution 
companies, became part of the gas value chain.  
The pricing of gas in LTCs has also undergone substantial changes. The liberalisation 
of gas markets in Europe coupled with (i) increased investment in LNG import 
terminals to benefit from global LNG trade and (ii) low gas demand following the 
economic crisis of 2008 and increased inter-fuel competition (e.g. uptake of coal and 
renewables in electricity generation) forced European buyers to renegotiate pricing 
mechanisms in their traditional contracts with pipeline suppliers. As such, since 
around 2010, a pricing system has emerged in Europe that is based on long-term oil-
indexed contracts as well as market prices settled in trading hubs (the National 
Balancing Point – NBP – in the UK and the TTF in Continental Europe). 
As a result of these regulatory interventions and changes in market dynamics, it is 
estimated that the overall volume of spot gas trade in Europe stood at 43% in 2013 
(Société Générale, 2013), rising to 61% in 2014 (International Gas Union, 2015), with 
the remainder being undertaken via traditional oil-indexed long-term bilateral 
contracts. 
Thus, the organisational form of gas trade in Europe has changed quite dramatically, 
with increasing trade volumes being transacted through organised markets rather 
than being dominated by bilateral contracts, as used to be the case. This point is also 
reinforced by the fact that the emergence of spot and futures markets for gas trade 
greatly reduces transaction costs of long-term contracting because (i) contracts are 
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standardised and hence easily transferable (traded) and (ii) prices are set 
transparently via multiple trades rather than costly bilateral (re)negotiations.7  
Furthermore, as we shall discuss below, the industry structure in Europe developed 
in response to changes in regulatory developments as well as to the degree of asset 
specificity involved in gas trade. 
 
3.2. Characteristics and evolution of gas infrastructure assets in 
Europe 
In the early days of the European gas industry, buyers and sellers relied on very large 
LTCs (in terms of offtake quantities) to develop gas fields and finance long-distance, 
cross-border pipelines and transmission and distribution systems. These LTCs 
essentially covered at least two part of the gas value chain: (i) production and (ii) 
transportation. On the buying side, buyers were vertically integrated (usually state-
owned) companies, which helped them develop and control national transmission 
and local distribution systems as well as gas sales and marketing. On the selling side, 
producers were responsible for developing gas fields and the associated 
infrastructure as well as large-scale, long-distance pipelines that usually crossed the 
borders of more than one country. This is particularly true for Russian gas supplies, 
whose pipelines sometimes crossed more than three countries before reaching 
delivery points in Europe. 
Thus, the traditional model – ‘from wellhead to burner tip’ – was effectively broken 
by EU legislation introduced to increase competition at the midstream and 
downstream levels of the European gas markets (see discussion above). Among other 
fundamental changes brought about by this legislation, one particular structural shift 
was the so-called ‘unbundling’ or breaking up of vertically integrated utility 
companies on the buy side, which could no longer control infrastructure components 
of the gas business. Transmission and distribution within Europe, previously seen as 
natural monopolies, are now managed by independent companies and are subject to 
regulation in terms of service quality and tariff setting. Thus, on the buy side at least, 
the transportation component became a separate regulated business activity and was 
no longer part of the chain of traditional LTCs between producers and buyers. A 
second structural shift was the introduction of third-party access to transport 
infrastructure in Europe; i.e. should there be demand for access to transport 
capacity, the independent operator should grant such access subject to technical and 
other requirements that are transparent to all market participants. Together these 
two changes meant that gas transportation infrastructure in Europe no longer posed 
a high risk for opportunism because these regulations essentially reduced the degree 
of asset specificity involved in gas transactions between buyers and sellers. Although 
investment in transmission and distribution is still durable and capital intensive, 
                                                          
7 For a detailed discussion on this point see Doane and Spulber, 1994. 
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albeit less so than it used to be, it is now less risky due to these sectors being 
regulated monopolies: if there is enough demand for new capacity, then the 
infrastructure is build and the capacity price regulated under some form of tariff 
regulation. 
In addition to changes in how gas transport infrastructure is governed in Europe, 
both pipelines and LNG, as a mode of transporting gas, have been subject to 
substantial cost reductions – or capital intensiveness – due to technological 
improvements. For a detailed discussion of cost reductions in pipeline and LNG 
transport see, for example, papers by Cornot-Gandolphe et al. (2003) and Jensen 
(2003). All else being equal, lower capital intensiveness leads to lower risks and 
potential losses arising from the ex post hold-up problem. The reduced risk of hold-
ups together with the changes in organisational form for the investment in and 
management of transport assets in Europe means that there is no longer a rationale 
for including these assets in traditional long-term purchase contracts between buyers 
and sellers, as was the case when the industry began to develop in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
Turning now to the selling side, production facilities, such as gas wells and treatment 
facilities, are not highly asset specific per se and can be used to produce gas for sales 
to any buyer or market provided that transportation to these markets and buyers is 
already established. Thus, the high asset specificity in the gas industry lies simply in 
transportation assets8, and in Europe, a part of these assets is now under regulation 
and poses a low risk of hold-ups. The only remaining issue is the long-distance 
pipelines connecting producers to European border points, most of which have 
already been developed as part of the first wave of LTCs between major producers 
(Russia, Norway and Algeria) and European buyers and have since been fully or 
substantially depreciated. We exclude from this discussion the issue of the transit 
monopoly and associated risks of supplying Russian gas to Europe, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, let it suffice to say that the perceived high 
monopoly power of transit countries and associated risks of rent expropriation by 
such transit countries motivates producers, such as Russia, to seek new capacity that 
it can control via LTCs or some other form of vertical integration.9 Nonetheless, 
going forward it is expected that the need for such ‘transit-bypass’ transport capacity 
will be minimal relative to the overall potential trade volume between Russia and 
Europe.10 
                                                          
8 For a detailed discussion of this point see Doane and Spulber, 1994. 
9 For example, the Belarus transit system, which is co-owned by Russia and Belarus, or the Blue 
Stream and Nord Stream pipeline investments that helped Russia reduce its dependence on 
traditional transit routes were carried out as joint ventures with Russia’s major gas buyers in Europe. 
10 Abstracting away from the politics of pipeline gas sales to Europe in light of the geopolitical tensions 
between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, the need for new bypass capacity is minimal since Russia has 
already invested in alternative transport capacity that bypasses Ukraine substantially in the past. 
Similarly, to completely circumvent Ukraine, Russia would require another transport route with 
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The above suggests that the role of LTCs in European gas trading will diminish 
substantially in the coming decades due to a decrease in (i) capital intensiveness and 
(ii) the level of asset specificity associated with changes in the regulatory regime 
governing the investment in and management of transport assets in Europe in 
particular and liberalisation process in general as well as higher volumes of LNG in 
overall gas trade (LNG is a more flexible mode of trade and is hence less asset 
specific). Next, we discuss some further empirical and theoretical studies on the 
changing nature of the gas trade in Europe and the implications for LTCs.  
 
3.3. Evidence of the declining role of LTCs in the European gas trade 
The theoretical literature on LTCs in the gas industry outlines the conditions under 
which markets or LTCs dominate. For example, Doane and Spulber (1994) showed 
that changes in the regulatory framework towards increased competition through 
unbundling, third-party access and the regulation of pipelines in the US gas industry 
decreased transaction costs between buyers and sellers, thereby enhancing spot 
trade. As discussed above, Doane and Spulber also stressed that the reduction in 
transaction costs comes from the fact that third-party access and the regulation of 
pipelines means that purchase contracts do not need to be tied to a specific pipeline 
and producer–buyer pair. Brito and Hartley (2002) applied a microeconomic 
(search) model and showed that the length of long-term LNG contracts was likely to 
diminish with (i) the decreasing capital intensiveness of the assets involved in LNG 
transactions, (ii) increasing cost of capital (discount rate) and (iii) a larger number of 
players in the market (suppliers and buyers). Brito and Hartley (2007) and Hartley 
(2015) also suggest that the role of long-term LNG contracts will diminish as spot 
market liquidity increases. In particular, Hartley (2015) uses a microeconomic model 
to show the link between increased LNG market liquidity, greater volumes, and 
destination flexibility in contracts and increased short-term and spot market trades, 
reinforcing increases in market liquidity.11 Similar findings were obtained by Parsons 
(1989), who applied an auction model to find the ‘strategic’ value12 of long-term gas 
contracts signed by producers such as Russia, Norway and Canada. Parsons found 
that the value of such contracts for the producer diminishes as (i) the number of 
wholesale buyers increases and (ii) the cost structure decreases prior to spot sales 
(capital intensiveness). 
There is also empirical work that analyses the impact of the changing structure and 
asset specificity of the European gas industry on LTCs and on contract duration in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
roughly 50–60 bcm/year, which is about 30% of its expected total annual contract volume to Europe 
in the next two decades. 
11 This theoretical prediction is in line with the view of some gas market analysts in Europe, who state 
that if spot trade exceeds 50% of all traded volume, the move towards complete spot trade is 
irreversible (see e.g. presentations and speeches by Thierry Bros, researcher from Société Générale). 
12 Defined in Parsons, 1989 as the difference between the value of the commodity in the LTC and the 
sales price in a more competitive market. 
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particular. For example, von Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) conducted an 
econometric analysis of over 300 LTCs and found an inverse relation between 
contract duration and (i) deliveries to the restructured markets of the US and UK as 
well as to the post-1998 markets of Continental Europe (i.e. after the first energy 
package), (ii) contracts not linked to substantial new investment and (iii) those 
signed by new market entrants. All else being equal, these findings suggest that as 
gas markets in Europe are liberalised and mature further (i.e. there is no need for 
substantial investment in infrastructure) and market entry increases (as discussed in 
the previous section), the duration of LTCs will decrease. 
A similar econometric analysis of 224 LNG contracts was conducted by Ruester 
(2009i), who found that: (i) as asset specificity decreases, so does the duration of 
LNG contracts; (ii) post-2000 LNG contracts are generally shorter than those signed 
before that period; and (iii) in the presence of high price uncertainty, contract 
duration tends to be lower. The last two conclusions are important in the sense that 
(i) post-2000 LNG contracts are shorter because of substantial cost reductions 
achieved across the whole LNG value chain and (ii) when prices are uncertain, the 
benefits of LTCs diminish due to potential profit from arbitrage, as prices tend to 
fluctuate more, while the cost of holding such contracts becomes higher in the sense 
of their ‘incompleteness’, as discussed in the previous section. This is especially true 
in the given examples of contract renegotiations between European buyers and 
sellers post-2008. 
We conduct back-of-the-envelope econometric analysis following the work of Joskow 
(1987) and von Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) but with some refinements to 
show empirically that the role of LTCs in Europe is declining. In particular, as argued 
in previous sections, we show that LNG trade is less asset specific than pipeline gas 
trade (in terms of technology, shipping is more flexible than piping); hence, LNG 
contracts should, on average, be shorter than pipeline gas contracts. Secondly, we 
include contracts signed by LNG ‘portfolio’ players (such as BP, BG and Shell) as a 
proxy for increased global spot and short-term trading and expect that these 
contracts are substantially shorter than both traditional LNG and pipeline gas 
contracts. Thirdly, we show that contracts with deliveries after 1998 to north-west 
European gas markets – the most liberalised market with sufficient liquidity – are 
substantially shorter than other pipeline contracts and also substantially shorter than 
those with deliveries to the remaining European gas markets. We also include other 
variables (see Appendix 1) following Joskow (1987) and von Hirschhausen and 
Neumann (2008). We estimate the effects of the above considerations on the 
duration of LTCs (Equation 1) using a database of 631 LNG and pipeline contracts 
gathered from publically available sources.13,14 
                                                          
13 Here, contract duration is measured as the difference between contract start and end dates. 
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𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃98 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃98+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 , (1) 
 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is the duration of contract i, 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is the annual contract quantity (ACQ), 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃98 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the contract was for 
deliveries to the UK, Germany, Belgium, France or the Netherlands after 1998 and 0 
otherwise, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃98 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for a contract 
delivered to the rest of the EU (excluding the north-west European markets 
mentioned above) after 1998 and 0 otherwise, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for contracts delivered from portfolio LNG suppliers (such as BG or 
BP), i.e. contracts not tied to a particular production location, and 0 otherwise, and 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for all LNG contracts in the 
sample and 0 otherwise.  
Our original database contained 672 contract entries. We excluded contracts with 
duration of less than five years so as not to exaggerate the effect of market 
liberalisation on the duration of LTCs. As such, following industry practice (see, for 
example, reports by the GIIGNL15), we consider an LTC to be any contract with 
duration of at least five years.16 Descriptive statistics and estimation results are 
reported in Appendix 1 and the main conclusions are shown in Table 2 and below. 
The results confirm the findings of the earlier empirical and theoretical work on 
LTCs discussed above. In particular, we found that: 
1. Contracts delivered to north-west European gas markets after the enactment 
of the first energy package (1998) were substantially shorter – by six years on 
average – than the other contracts in the sample. They were also significantly 
shorter – by around four years –than the same contracts delivered to other 
European markets, where spot markets are substantially underdeveloped. 
Contracts delivered to other European markets after 1998 were also generally 
shorter (𝛽𝛽4 = −1.9) than the other contracts in the sample. As such, market 
liberalisation in Europe, together with a general reduction in the capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14 The data was obtained from a database of contracts for pipeline gas and LNG published online by 
researchers from the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) (Neumann, et al., 2015) as well 
as from Poten and Partners’ LNG contract database, accessed through the Bloomberg Terminal. 
15 An annual publication on the state of the LNG market issued by the International Group of 
Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL). These reports contain information on the share of spot 
and short- and long-term trade and contain definitions of spot and short-term contracts. 
http://www.giignl.org/publications. 
16 In their analyses, von Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) and Ruester (2009) included contracts 
with duration of less than five years. Although this would not change their conclusions, it could bias 
the results in favour of spot market and shorter contract duration as these short-term contracts were 
in force after 1998 and could potentially exaggerate the effect of downstream competition and 
European market liberalisation on the duration of LTCs. 
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intensiveness of infrastructure assets, has indeed reduced the role of LTCs, 
specifically, by negatively affecting the duration of such contracts.  
2. LNG contracts were shorter on average than pipeline gas contracts. This 
confirms our thesis that (i) LNG is more flexible by nature and (ii) access to 
LNG markets reduces the overall level of asset specificity involved in gas 
trade, especially for European pipeline gas trade.  
3. Moreover, flexible LNG contracts were 2.5 years shorter on average than 
pipeline gas contracts and 0.7 years shorter than the average LNG contract. 
This confirms the argument that as trade becomes more flexible, the role of 
LTCs will diminish.17  
4. Finally, as suggested by the transaction cost economics framework, the 
presence of dedicated assets, measured indirectly as the volume of ACQ, 
increases contract duration but at a diminishing rate (the slope of ACQ 
squared term 𝛽𝛽2 is negative) (see Joskow, 1987 for details).  
Table 2: Estimation results of determinants of LTCs for natural gas. 
Independent 
Variables 
Regressors 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 – Contract 
duration (Eq. 1) 
Constant 19.248 
(0.754) 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽1 0.836*** 
(0.172) 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
2 𝛽𝛽2 -0.022*** 
(0.008) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃98 𝛽𝛽3 -6.007*** 
(0.867) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃98 𝛽𝛽4 -1.905** 
(0.775) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 𝛽𝛽5 -2.594*** 
(0.976) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 𝛽𝛽6 -1.841*** 
(0.679) 
R-squared 0.129 
Adjusted R-squared 0.120 
No. observations 631 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** indicates significance at the 
99% level; ** indicates significance at the 95% level. 
 
To summarise, the theoretical literature and empirical evidence suggest that the 
European gas industry has changed dramatically in the last 20 years in response to 
regulatory, technological and industrial dynamics. The industry has gradually 
transformed from domination by state-owned monopolies and rigid bilateral 
                                                          
17 Recent LNG deals between EDF and Cheniere and EDF and Kogas are examples of a trend towards 
even greater flexibility for LNG trade. This requires traditional pipeline suppliers to Europe to re-
think their sales strategies. 
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contracts to a more competitive market. Thus, it is important to understand 
alternative (i.e. non-LTC) sales strategies in the newly established European gas 
market order. This is the aim of the following section. 
4. Sales strategies in the new European gas order 
Since 2010, the European gas industry has witnessed several waves of LTC price and 
volume renegotiations by European utilities and leading upstream producers and gas 
suppliers, such as Statoil, GasTerra, Sonatrach and Gazprom. Due to the commercial 
sensitivities of these contract renegotiations, no details about pricing and other 
settlement provisions are publically available; however, we can conclude from 
various trade publications and official press releases that: 
1. Gazprom has focussed on defending oil indexation and has offered retroactive 
discounts on existing contracts, introducing a limited degree of spot 
indexation; in some instances it has made discounts on ‘P0’ – initial contract 
prices (the netback value of a basket of competing fuels); 
2. Sonatrach has also focused on defending oil indexation and has agreed to give 
retroactive discounts and also to reduce minimum take-or-pay provisions; 
3. GasTerra has been less defensive of the old pricing system and more willing to 
offer rebates and introduce more spot indexation in its contracts; 
4. among the big suppliers, Statoil has offered the most flexibility in terms of 
pricing and volumes – it is estimated that 75–80% of Statoil’s total export to 
Europe is currently spot indexed (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Statoil’s pricing mechanisms. 
Source: Sætre (2013). 
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The flexibility that Statoil has shown in adapting to structural changes in the markets 
is believed to be a source of its strength; it is something that has allowed the 
company to strengthen its position in the short term18 and may bring greater 
shareholder value in the medium term, especially when gas market demand in 
Europe recovers, providing more trading and arbitrage opportunities. 
To turn structural changes in the markets into competitive advantage, Statoil has 
quickly changed its sales strategy, shifting away from rigid LTCs towards increased 
sales through traded markets as well as direct marketing and sales to end users 
(Figure 2).19 As noted, spot-indexation as a pricing mechanism now dominates 
Statoil’s sales portfolio. Thus, Statoil is becoming increasingly like the ISTM gas 
business entity. Of course, the natural question for our research is why Statoil 
decided to be the ‘first mover’ and to embrace spot indexation and wholesale trading 
so fully. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of Statoil’s sales channels 
Source: Sætre (2013). 
 
A combination of factors allowed Statoil to quickly see structural changes not as 
threats but as business opportunities, including: 
1. Statoil is mandated by the Norwegian government to be a single export 
‘channel’ for all gas coming out of equity participation by Statoil and the 
                                                          
18 In particular, pricing flexibility allowed the company to take market shares from Gazprom and 
Sonatrach in 2012. 
19 For example, its recent deals with large industrial customers and electric utilities (e.g. contracts with 
Stadtwerke Düsseldorf and Koch Supply and Trading) are examples of innovative deals that allowed 
Statoil to enjoy higher margins by bypassing the traditional importers. 
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government; thus, Statoil is responsible for marketing and sales for 80% of 
Norwegian gas production;  
2. among the major European gas suppliers, Statoil has the flexible capacity to 
follow demand and arbitrage opportunities. 
Statoil’s geographical position is one important source of flexibility: the Norwegian 
gas production system is connected directly to the most liquid trading hubs in north-
west Europe. Statoil has six delivery points, all of which are in the largest and most 
liquid hubs: NBP and TTF.20 The average distance between the gas fields in the 
Norwegian continental shelf and these delivery points is 400–1,200 km; this is six 
times shorter than Russian gas has to travel before entering north-west Europe, four 
times shorter than Caspian gas routes to Central Europe and three times shorter than 
Algerian gas routes to Southern Europe. In combination with its two large gas fields, 
Troll and Oseberg, which have production flexibility and act as swing capacity, 
Statoil’s geographical position means that the company can react proactively to price 
fluctuations at hubs, optimise its production and sales and exploit arbitrage 
opportunities in north-west Europe more easily than any other major supplier in 
Europe. A simple econometric analysis showing the relationship between net gas 
outputs21 (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖) from the Troll and Oseberg fields and market factors highlights these 
points: 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷14 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷2, (2) 
 
where NPB is the day-ahead spot price (monthly averages), Season is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 between October and March and 0 otherwise, SpotIndex is 
a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 2012, when the positive effect of increased 
spot indexation allowed Statoil to take market shares from other suppliers, and 0 
otherwise, ActiveTrading is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 2011–2015, the 
period when structural shifts in the market affected Statoil’s contracts, pricing and 
sales strategy, and 0 otherwise, RU_Undersupply_14 is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 for the winter of 2014/2015, when Russian supplies to Europe were 
minimised due to a number of factors, including reducing oversupply and stopping 
Ukrainian imports from Europe, and 0 otherwise, DummyUK1 is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for the period between October 2006 and July 2007, representing 
the effects of a temporary gas glut in the UK due to increased importation from the 
Langeled and BBL pipelines and failure of the IUK to export the surplus to 
Continental Europe (Poten and Partners, 2007), and 0 otherwise, and DummyUK2 is 
a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the winter of 2005/2006, to account for tight 
                                                          
20 St Fergus (UK), Easington (UK), Dunkerque (France), Zeebrugge (Belgium), Emden (Netherlands) 
and Dornum (Germany). 
21 We excluded from the estimation gas production volume that goes into oil injections. Thus, net gas 
output from Troll and Oseberg represents marketable gas. By excluding gas production for enhanced 
oil recovery, we separate the possible effect of oil price dynamics on gas output from these two fields. 
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supply condition in the UK22, and 0 otherwise. The regression (Eq. 2) is estimated 
using monthly data from January 2001 to March 2015, and the results are reported 
in Table 3. 
Table 3: Flexibility of Troll and Oseberg net gas output: Econometric results. 
Independent 
Variables 
Regressors Troll 
output 
Oseberg 
output 
Troll and 
Oseberg 
output 
Constant 1.422 
(0.108) 
0.064 
(0.034) 
1.486 
(0.118) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝛽𝛽1 0.064*** 
(0.017) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.080*** 
(0.019) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝛽𝛽2 0.978*** 
(0.084) 
0.164*** 
(0.026) 
1.142*** 
(0.092) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝛽𝛽3 0.591*** 
(0.175) 
0.186*** 
(0.055) 
0.776*** 
(0.192) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝛽𝛽4 -0.242** 
(0.123) 
-0.097** 
(0.039) 
-0.339** 
(0.135) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷14 𝛽𝛽5 0.659*** 
(0.237) 
0.188** 
(0.074) 
0.847*** 
(0.260) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷1 𝛽𝛽6 0.565*** 
(0.165) 
-0.064 
(0.052) 
0.502*** 
(0.181) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷2 𝛽𝛽7 -0.432 
(0.267) 
0.030 
(0.083) 
-0.402 
(0.292) 
R-squared 0.581 0.357 0.617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.563 0.330 0.600 
No. observations 171 171 171 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** indicates significance at the 99% level; ** indicates 
significance at the 95% level. 
 
As expected, Troll and Oseberg, serving as Norwegian swing production capacity, 
show the most flexibility in reacting to changes in market dynamics. Production from 
these two fields follows spot prices (NBP) closely with the expected positive sign 
(𝛽𝛽1 > 0: higher spot prices lead to higher output and vice versa) and this output–
price relationship is statistically significant.23 Furthermore, Statoil’s swift decision to 
introduce a much bigger share of spot indexation in its contracts paid off in 2012, 
when Norwegian gas sales to Europe reached 114 bcm (one of the highest levels in its 
history of supplying gas to Europe), and this lead to an average increase in 
production from both fields (𝛽𝛽3 > 0) of roughly 0.59 bcm/month (Troll) more than 
                                                          
22 See ‘Rogers and Howard (2010). “LNG trade-flows in the Atlantic basin, trends and discontinuities,” 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies’ for a detailed account of the reasons behind these spikes. 
23 Note that we also included (in Eq. 2) the Average German Import Price (AGIP) as a proxy for oil-
indexed gas contract price to see if outputs from these fields closely tracks AGIP. We found no 
statistically significant relationship between outputs and AGIP. We also used AGIP instead of NBP 
prices in Eq. 2 and found a statistical significant (positive) relationship between AGIP and outputs 
from these two fields; however, the relationship was much weaker compared to that found using NBP 
prices (comparison based on the significance level, P, of the beta coefficients). 
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the average monthly production in the sample. Similarly, when Russia limited its 
supplies to Europe during the winter of 2014/2015, this led to an immediate reaction 
by Statoil to increase production from both fields in that period (𝛽𝛽5 > 0) by 0.847 
bcm/month. 
The most interesting and striking result is the estimation of coefficient 𝛽𝛽4, which is 
negative. This means that output from both fields in the period 2011–2015 is lower 
on average than in the analysed sample, and this result is statistically significant. 
There are several possible explanations for the negative coefficient 𝛽𝛽4. One could 
argue that the lower output from Troll and Oseberg observed after 2011 was the 
result of a natural decline in field pressure. We can rule out this hypothesis since gas 
production from Troll started in 1996 and the production rate has not yet peaked 
because, according to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD, 2015a), initial 
recoverable gas from Troll is more than 1.4 tcm and as of 2014, around 35% of that 
had been depleted. Similarly, gas production from Oseberg has also not yet peaked: 
production started in 2000 and as of 2014, around 35% of the total recoverable (113 
bcm) gas had been depleted (NPD, 2015b).  
For the Troll output, one potential explanation for the lower output observed since 
2011 is that the field has been undergoing major maintenance work due to the 
breakdown of a compressor station, which limited its flexibility during winter 
periods. The maintenance work started around 2013 and was completed in mid 2015. 
Looking at the monthly production data from Troll, we can confirm that the 
maintenance work did indeed affected the flexibility of the field; however, this only 
occurred for the winter of 2013/2014, when production was 11% lower on average 
than output during the winter of 2012/2013. Nonetheless, this one-off effect does not 
change the significance of the coefficient 𝛽𝛽4, which measures the average monthly 
output for 2011–2015 compared to 2001–2010 and not just the peak periods. 
Furthermore, the effect could have dragged down the seasonal dummy coefficient 𝛽𝛽2, 
but this coefficient is still statistically significant. We also introduced a separate 
dummy variable for the winter of 2013/2014 to control for the effect of field 
maintenance on Troll output and on the coefficient 𝛽𝛽4, but the dummy is statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, we are not aware of any maintenance work at the Oseberg 
field after 2011. 
One final possible explanation for this result (𝛽𝛽4 < 0) is that the period 2011–2015 
coincided with a period of ‘demand destruction’ in Europe, which was due to the 
prolonged financial crisis and increased inter-fuel competition in the power-
generation sector. Indeed, total European gas consumption in this period fell by 6.2% 
year-on-year (YoY) (Figure 3: EU gas consumption, left exhibit), and one can 
conclude that outputs from these two fields followed a general trend of demand 
reduction observed in that period. However, we can rule out this explanation for the 
following reasons. In the same period, Norwegian production actually grew by 0.6% 
YoY (Figure 3: Norwegian gas production, left exhibit). Secondly, Norwegian exports 
to Europe in that period also grew by an average of 4% YoY (Figure 3: right exhibit), 
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the highest export growth rate among the major suppliers (in the same period, 
Russian and Dutch supplies grew by an average of 2% YoY, while Algerian exports 
declined by an average of 12% YoY due to its immovable position on oil-indexation). 
EU gas consumption and Norwegian 
production 
 
Pipeline supplies to Europe 
 
 
Figure 3: EU Gas Consumption and pipeline supplies by major producers. 
Sources: EU consumption and Norwegian production are from BP (2015) and 
Pipeline supplies to Europe from IEA (2015b) 
Altogether, this means that while production and exports from Norway to Europe 
grew over 2011–2015, monthly outputs from Statoil’s Troll and Oseberg fields were 
10% and 41% lower on average, respectively, than the monthly average output since 
2001 (as noted, this reduction in outputs is statistically significant, 𝛽𝛽4 Table 3). We 
consider this to be a startling manifestation of a new gas sales strategy in a liberalised 
market – one that is based on direct and active trading and engagement with spot 
pricing. Clearly, these two fields serve as marginal fields and, as such, its flexibility 
means Statoil is able to respond optimally to spot prices and market dynamics: in an 
environment of oversupply and increased inter-fuel competition from other energy 
sources, the ability to shift production from flexible fields to future periods to place 
upward pressure on current spot prices surely creates value for Statoil. However, 
such a strategic response is only possible when a company is actively participating in 
liquid trading markets to understand market dynamics fully and benefits from 
information flows. 
The responses of other suppliers highlight their current competitive positions but 
also these suppliers’ visions of where the European gas markets are moving to. It is 
clear that GasTerra and Statoil saw the imminent collapse of the old contracting and 
pricing regime as both were flexible with regard to both volumes and the 
incorporation of spot pricing into their contracts. By contrast, Gazprom’s response 
formally retained the dominance of oil indexation but gave discounts and retroactive 
rebates to cover the differences in oil and spot prices, and as such, Gazprom was able 
to win back its market share in 2013, when its exports grew by 13% relative to 2012. 
However, the overall performance of Gazprom in that period was less impressive 
compared to Statoil’s performance (2% YoY growth compared to Statoil’s 4%). 
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Another interesting response came from Algerian Sonatrach, which was able to 
defend the dominance of oil indexation in its contract; however, this came at the 
expense of decreased volumes, specifically, this resulted in an average decline in 
pipeline exports to Europe of 12% YoY in 2011–2014. By contrast, both Statoil and 
GasTerra have been actively trading in the markets and took the opportunities posed 
by market liberalisation to scale-up their marketing activities selling directly to large 
industrial customers and power generators. This allowed them to bypass traditional 
importers and therefore enabled them to capture some of the downstream margin 
not available before. 
In traditional LTCs the take-or-pay and carry-forward clauses grant buyers with 
offtake flexibility and are thus burdensome for producers, which have to retain 
production and transport capacity to accommodate buyers’ requests for increased 
offtake, sometimes at short notice. Under LTCs, the pricing of these bundled 
products was fairly uncomplicated and was indexed to a basket of competing fuels 
(oil products in particular). However, when spot markets emerged in Europe, moving 
to spot indexation would not necessarily correctly reflect the value of those bundled 
products for producers in rigid LTCs. Realising this potential shortcoming, both 
Statoil and GasTerra agreed to move to spot indexation but also introduced greater 
product variety to define more clearly those additional benefits that were previously 
bundled together in LTCs. For example, many market participants in North-west 
Europe now offer, among others, the following hub-based sales products: 
1. flat volumes, where those customers who wish to have offtake flexibility or 
price certainty (fixed price or indeed oil indexing) pay extra; 
2. varieties of structured products that reflect the needs of customers, such as 
temperature-dependent products;  
3. standardised products at virtual trading hubs; 
4. other services such as balancing and flexible procurement profiles. 
In a nutshell, Statoil and GasTerra have transitioned from pure commodity 
producers to sellers of structural solutions around a core commodity: they have 
become gas producers with integrated supply, trading and marketing activities. And 
this strategy is expected to pay off in liberalised and increasingly liquid markets as it 
allows these companies to learn about their customers’ preferences, needs and 
expectations. Note that central to the Statoil’s ISTM strategy is the development of 
strong trading functionality to support upstream production, hedging and profit 
generation; its direct marketing activities seem to supplement trading and 
production activities. Put differently, marketing activities for large hydrocarbon 
producers, such as Statoil, exist to hedge and supplement trading activities. 
Overall, Statoil leveraged this position with enhanced wholesale trading, seeing the 
ISTM model as a substitute for a system of rigid bilateral contracts. From Statoil’s 
financial reports we can understand that its business model is organised around two 
main units: (i) development and production (DP), both in Norway and 
internationally, and (ii) marketing, midstream and processing (MMP), which was 
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known as marketing, processing and renewables before the 2015 reorganisation. The 
MMP division is responsible for the marketing, trading, transportation and 
processing of oil, petroleum products and natural gas. It is therefore is a single 
trading and marketing channel for all of Statoil’s and the Norwegian government’s 
(State's Direct Financial Interest, SDFI) equity gas (Figure 4). According to its 
financial reports, most of the MMP division’s business values come from wholesale 
gas trading, and the contribution of MMP to the group’s overall operating profit was 
ca. 15% in 2014.24 The profitability of the MMP unit is the margin between the 
transfer price and the invoiced (realised) price (Figure 5). The transfer price is what 
MMP pays for gas received from Statoil’s development and production subsidiary 
(Figure 4: DP Norway) and also to the SDFI for gas traded and marketed on behalf of 
the government. The pricing mechanism established for the transfer price is based on 
market-based arrangements, which reflect Statoil’s sales portfolio (Statoil, 2012). 
The invoice price is the actual price that the MMP gets from selling SDFI and DP 
Norway gas, and this invoiced price depends on the strength of the performance of 
traders and marketers working in the MMP division. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified schematic of Statoil’s organisational model of gas sales, 
marketing and trading. 
 
                                                          
24 Note that the overall value of a trading unit (in terms of a percentage of overall profit) for a gas 
producer varies according to commodity prices. 
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Figure 5: Statoil’s invoiced and transfer prices. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Statoil’s quarterly reports, available from the 
company’s website. 
Figure 5 shows both the invoiced and transfer prices based on Statoil’s financial 
reports. Note that before major gas price renegotiations, Statoil’s invoiced price 
closely tracked the AGIP, which represented the oil-indexed gas price before 
renegotiations (around 2011). Since around 2012, Statoil’s invoiced price diverged 
from AGIP, becoming cheaper and more volatile in response to market dynamics 
rather than the oil-indexed price. It seems that Statoil’s transfer prices also track a 
combination of both AGIP and NBP: before renegotiations it follows AGIP dynamics, 
but after price reviews it follows NBP dynamics more closely. Note that after 2011, 
AGIP was partially decoupled from a purely oil-indexed price formula because, being 
an average import price for all sources into Germany, AGIP also includes Statoil’s 
invoiced prices, with an increasing share of spot indexation.  
As such, the value of Statoil’s MMP, or the ISTM sales model more generally, is that 
it allows commodity producers to better optimise their sales and production 
decisions in response to market conditions. It also gives an extra margin by taking 
arbitrage opportunities and capturing downstream margins through direct 
marketing activities. In addition to these benefits, the ISTM model is also able to 
react strategically to market dynamics; for example, by reducing supplies when 
markets are oversupplied (similar to the empirical results we found for the outputs of 
Statoil’s swing production capacity). Thus, the optimal exercise of pricing power does 
not come solely from the size a producer’s gas reserves but rather stems from a 
combination of large reserves and ISTM activities. 
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Had Sonatrach or Gazprom accepted full spot indexation without developing ISTM 
activities, then they would probably not be able to enjoy prices higher than Statoil’s 
transferred prices and, most probably, would see prices even lower than those levels. 
One can conclude that full spot indexation without ISTM capabilities would turn 
Sonatrach and Gazprom into price-takers.25 This explains why Sonatrach was the 
most ardent supporter of oil indexation and also why Gazprom went for partial spot 
indexation, reflecting its stronger downstream position relative to Sonatrach. 
However, Gazprom’s position in the spot markets is limited to its trading arm, 
Gazprom Marketing and Trading, which does not enjoy the same scale, scope and 
privileges as Statoil’s MMP, as the single export, trading and marketing channel for 
all gas coming out of equity participation between the Statoil group and the 
Norwegian government. Had Gazprom channelled all of its future sales through a 
marketing and trading division, its profits would have been considerably higher. 
Quantifying the impact of this strategy on Gazprom’s profits is the aim of the rest of 
this paper. 
 
5. Economics of Gazprom’s sales strategies in Europe  
5.1. Characterisation of sales strategies and modelling 
considerations 
For our quantitative analyses we look into the two possible sales strategies available 
to Gazprom: (i) the border sales strategy suggested by Gazprom (see e.g. Miller 2015) 
and (ii) the ISTM sales strategy discussed above. Note that these two sales strategies 
could supplement sales through existing LTCs, some of which last longer than 15 or 
20 years. This section therefore discusses the implementation of these sales 
strategies in the modelling and analytical framework. 
Gazprom’s proposed border sales strategy corresponds to a model of a pure upstream 
producer, whereby it has rather limited knowledge of the wholesale market and takes 
the pricing of gas at trading hubs as a given, that is, being price-taker. One may argue 
that retreating to the borders is not a ‘dumb’ strategy, as we describe, and that 
Gazprom can always respond to market and non-market dynamics by ‘adjusting the 
gas valve’ at its borders. However, we consider this strategy to be politically risky in 
that it triggers further diversification efforts from EU countries. It is evident that 
even with the current political tension between Europe and Russia, the official policy 
of Brussels and countries that are highly dependent on Russian gas is to diversify 
away from Russia. Therefore, a more ‘intelligent’ border sales strategy in this sense 
would appear commercially implausible for Gazprom. Furthermore, even if Gazprom 
adjusts the gas valves purely for commercial reasons (i.e. responding to the glut in 
                                                          
25 They have been price-takers under full oil-indexation nonetheless. However, at least none of the gas 
players in Europe were able to influence oil prices, and, hence, the perception and argument of 
‘fairness’ of oil-indexation exists. 
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the global markets), one could argue that it would either under- or over-sell relative 
to the optimal volume that the market could take, and, therefore, there is little basis 
for correctly adjusting the gas valves. Thus, in the border sales strategy scenario we 
do not consider this type of ‘intelligence’ and instead consider that if Gazprom 
pursues a border sales strategy for the uncontracted volume, then it will most likely 
be a price-taker. In such a situation, Gazprom will attempt to price its gas to cover all 
capital and operating expenses, i.e. pricing on a long-run marginal cost basis. 
At the other extreme is the integrated model – the ISTM sales strategy – which has at 
least one advantage over border sales in that it allows producers to engage actively 
with trading and pricing at the wholesale level and, hence, potentially allows for 
more optimal – or at least responsive – strategic sales behaviour compared to border 
sales and other strategies (such as the recent sales auctions organised by Gazprom). 
The two sales strategies are depicted in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Simplified schematic of ISTM and border sales strategies. 
We evaluate the impact of the two sales strategies on Gazprom’s export profits. These 
strategies are evaluated for incremental volumes of export into Europe: the volumes 
that are above the already-contracted volumes under Gazprom’s existing LTCs. 
1. Border sales strategy: Sales under already-signed LTCs with pricing based on 
some form of oil indexation with marginal spot indexation but supplemented 
by border sales for incremental (uncontracted) volumes (see Figure 7). 
2. ISTM sales strategy: Sales under already-signed LTCs with pricing based on 
some form of oil indexation with marginal spot indexation but supplemented 
by direct trading and sales at the liquid trading hubs of north-west Europe for 
incremental (uncontracted) volumes (see Figure 7). 
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For the border sales strategy we assume that gas buyers from Europe will buy 
incremental gas volumes at the Russian border at a competitive price (based on the 
long-run marginal supply cost) and then transport the product to European markets 
for resale. However, under the ISTM strategy we assume that Gazprom it able to 
pursue active trading and direct sales at hubs. We believe that this is a valid 
assumption given that Gazprom has many well-established downstream subsidiaries 
in Europe, such as Gazprom Marketing and Trading (London), which can take care of 
trading and direct sales on behalf of the entire group, similarly to Statoil’s MMP 
division. 
As noted above, one benefit of wholesale trading is the opportunity to learn and 
understand market dynamics and price-quantity responsiveness (i.e. price 
responsiveness or price elasticity of demand, PED) in the markets and, hence, to 
develop an optimal export strategy based on different products, contracts and 
integrated solutions. Conversely, a border sales strategy, as suggested before, 
translates into price-taking behaviour as producers in this situation do not 
participate in wholesale markets and therefore have no (less) credible information 
about market dynamics; such producers are focused only on selling a commodity. 
In a nutshell, the difference between the two strategies in our quantitative analysis 
and modelling is that under ISTM, Gazprom can exploit pricing power, while under 
its border sales strategy, Gazprom’s pricing strategy is price-taking. Hence, our 
research question is whether pricing power in a liberalised market with potential 
entry from low-cost producers would be better for Gazprom than pursuing border 
sales and being a price-taker. More formally, Gazprom’s export profit, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖, is defined: max
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖≥0
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)� − 𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖), (3) 
 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is sales to the market, 𝑆𝑆�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)� is wholesale price which depends on 
total supplies to that market 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) and 𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) is supplies by other 
exporters (non-Gazprom) which is a function of sales volume by Gazprom, 𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) is 
Gazprom’s total supply cost function to that market such that 𝐶𝐶′(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) > 0, 𝐶𝐶′′(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) > 0. 
Note that profit function (3) is a simplified version of the function used in the global 
gas market model that incorporates many other features such as contractual and 
physical constraints and other decision variables, such as dispatch, injection and 
withdrawal etc. Thus, marginal profit should be: 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
= 𝑆𝑆 + 𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
�1 + 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
� 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 −
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
, (4) 
 
where 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
< 0 is a slope of the demand curve and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
= 𝜃𝜃 is the constant “conjectural 
variation” (CV). Note that for 𝜃𝜃 = −1 yields the pure competition game, while 𝜃𝜃 = 0 
represents the Cournot game.  
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Therefore, under ISTM strategy we assume 𝜃𝜃 = 0 and as for the border sales strategy 
– 𝜃𝜃 = −1. We define the net benefit of the ISTM model for Gazprom (annual 
average), 𝜈𝜈, as the difference in profits from realising these two alternative sales 
strategies: 
𝜈𝜈 = ∑ �𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 − 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶(1 + 𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃 �25𝑃𝑃=0 25 , 
(5) 
 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is Gazprom’s total profit under the ISTM sales strategy and 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 
is the total profit under the border sales strategy. Both profit (pre-tax) streams are 
discounted at an interest rate of 10% (r) over a time horizon of 25 years (2015–
2039). Obviously, as Eq. (4) and (5) suggest, the costs and benefits of these strategies 
depend on a number of issues, including: 
1. the cost structure of firms competing in European gas markets; 
2. the behaviour of market players – price-taking or exercising pricing power; 
3. price responsiveness or PED in the European gas markets; 
4. infrastructure characteristics, such as the available supply capacity 
(production, pipelines and LNG terminal capacities) and investment costs to 
expand capacity. 
Note that other benefits of the ISTM sales strategy that are commonly discussed in 
the oil and gas industry, such as portfolio optimisation, operational and logistical 
benefits and trading with flexible and diverse products are not considered as part of 
this modelling exercise. Furthermore, we do not value the marketing part of the 
ISTM model since this would require very detailed and sophisticated modelling that 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Marketing and further downstream activities 
include participation in the electricity generation sector, carbon trading, energy 
efficiency and other end uses of gas as an energy carrier and product (e.g. for the 
chemical industry). These other benefits were discussed in the previous section. 
Here, we argue that these micro-level, operational benefits of ISTM are in fact an 
integral part of ISTM’s strategic value creation: the ability to exploit market 
opportunities to raise pricing power and the ability to actively engage in pricing go 
hand in hand with day-to-day trading in liquid markets. Thus, the primary aim of 
this paper is to show that the benefit of ISTM at the macro and strategic level is the 
ability to understand wholesale markets and, hence, the possibility of exploiting 
pricing power for large integrated players. Furthermore, as we show, the ISTM sales 
strategy also has a strategic options value that gives integrated players the ability to 
respond strategically to disruptive events in gas markets, such as entry by very-low-
cost producers or increased inter-fuel competition due to strategic investments on 
the buyers’ side. 
Taking into account the above considerations, we use a global gas market model to 
simulate different market and non-market scenarios and quantify the costs and 
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benefits of the two strategies. In the next section we discuss the methodology, 
assumptions and scenarios for this analysis. 
 
5.2. Methodology, assumptions and scenarios 
The global gas market model (see Appendix 2 for a general description and Chyong 
and Hobbs, forthcoming, for a detailed description) has been developed to conduct 
quantitative analyses of important market and policy issues affecting gas markets. 
For details of the data and assumptions used in the model, see Appendix 3. The 
model is founded on basic microeconomic concepts and game theory principles, 
namely: 
1. Each player in the model maximises his profit given a set of constraints (such 
as production or transmission capacity) and the endogenous actions of the 
other market participants. 
2. The upstream natural gas market is concentrated such that some large gas 
producers and exporters have pricing power: in economic terms, they can see 
market elasticity of demand and can therefore actively price gas by 
withdrawing sales volume to increase prices and profit; however, the model 
can also simulate price-taking behaviour. 
We model the whole gas market value chain, including the following market players 
with the corresponding competition behaviour: 
1. gas production and trading – can be modelled as imperfectly (exercising 
market power) or perfectly competitive (price-taking); 
2. pipeline and LNG – pipeline transport as well as LNG regasification and 
liquefaction services are priced efficiently, i.e. with no market power; 
3. LNG shipping – marginal cost-based pricing; 
4. gas storage – storage operations are priced efficiently, i.e. with no market 
power; 
5. final markets – represented by inverse demand curves that show how the 
clearing (equilibrium) price depends on total supplies to that market. 
Using the global gas market model, we estimate Eq. (5) for a set of scenarios as 
outlined in Table 4 below. We develop these scenarios to test the robustness of the 
two sales strategies under a threat of market entry by low-cost producers. Thus, the 
difference between Scenarios A (B) and C (D) will illustrate the net benefit of the two 
sales strategies under conditions of market entry by low-cost producers. 
Table 4: Analysed scenarios and their main characteristics. 
 Border 
sales 
ISTM 
sales 
Entry of low-cost 
producers  
Scenario A Yes   
Scenario B Yes  Yes 
Scenario C  Yes  
Scenario D  Yes Yes 
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Our assumption for Russia’s export potential to Europe is based on the following 
considerations. We take the average gas exports to Europe (excluding Turkey but 
including Ukraine) in 2010–2014 as a starting point and then assume that Russia is 
able to scale up its production by 50 bcm/year (reference scenario for our analyses). 
The difference between the assumed total export potential and the total annual 
contract quantity (ACQ) to Europe gives us a possible scenario for how much gas 
(free volumes or uncontracted gas) is available for either the border sales strategy 
(Scenarios A and B) or the ISTM sales strategy (Scenarios C and D). Figure 7 shows 
these assumptions. 
 
Figure 7: Russia's export potential and uncontracted volumes. 
Note: * ACQ figures exclude contracts to Turkey but includes volumes to Ukraine. 
Source: ACQ is based on actual exports to Europe in 2010–2014, as reported by 
Gazprom, and the decline rate in the contract volumes in 2015–2039 is based on the 
assumptions and data reported in Mitrova et al., (2015). 
 
The purpose of examining a scenario of market entry by low-cost producers 
(Scenarios B and D) is to conduct a ‘stress test’ of Gazprom’s possible sales strategies 
and is not to argue for particular future developments of global supply and demand. 
Examples of possible market entry by low-cost producers are numerous. For 
example, consider the potentially negative impact of the US LNG exports26, and in 
particular possible impact of additional export volumes that could come out of the 
Middle East region, for example, Iran, Iraq and indeed cancellation of Qatari’s 
exploration moratorium and hence possible ramp up of additional export volume 
from Qatar. In addition to the possibility that Qatar may cancel its exploration 
                                                          
26 The CEO of Cheniere recently stated that the LNG Sabine Pass project could deliver LNG to Europe 
at $4.50/mmbtu, which is believed to be very close to Gazprom’s short-run marginal cost to Europe, 
including taxes (see http://blog.argusmedia.com/how-will-gazprom-handle-the-lng-glut/). 
Free (uncontracted) 
volumes to Europe 
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moratorium, note that as the uncontracted volume of Qatari gas production increases 
(estimated to be around 40 bcm/year by 2025, rising to 100 bcm by 2035, assuming 
no expansion of current production capacity), Qatar could face a similar dilemma to 
Gazprom with regard to the two sales strategies. Currently, Qatar is selling most of its 
volumes under long-term oil-indexed contracts. However, as we move to an 
oversupply environment, there is increasing pressure from buyers to at least partially 
index their LNG contracts to spot price indices. In this situation, Qatar may well 
decide to supplement its long-term sales with border sales to defend its market share 
and hence flood international markets with extremely low-cost gas. Qatar’s 
incentives to flood the markets with cheap gas could be fuelled further if the country 
observes that, in addition to the pressure from US and Australian LNG exports, 
Gazprom is pursuing a similar strategy of aggressively taking over market shares. 
This may trigger Qatar to sell more gas at very low and competitive prices.  
As noted, our analyses of these market entry scenarios aim to test the robustness of 
the two sales strategies and not to predict particular supply behaviour and future 
market dynamics. However, these examples stress that the probability of such 
market entries and supply behaviour is positive and, if they occurred, this would 
have a highly negative impact on Gazprom’s business. However small these 
probabilities may be, such events are high-impact low-probability events that could 
remove unprepared business entities from the market completely. Thus, for the 
purpose of examining how Gazprom’s possible sales strategies could mitigate this 
potential negative impact, we assume for Scenarios B and D that by 2025 low-cost 
producers could potentially export up to 100 bcm/year to global markets, rising to 
200 bcm by 2035.27 We also assume that such low-cost producers’ sales strategies 
will likely maximise sales rather than prices, making them price-takers. This is most 
likely to be true of US exports but may also be the case in Iran and Iraq as well as 
Qatar, if it decides to defend its market position in light of increased upstream 
competition. 
 
5.2.1. Representing LTCs in the gas market model 
As noted, gas trade in Europe (and in other regions) is still dominated by bilateral 
LTCs (see Table A.7, Appendix 3 for the assumed annual contract quantity of the 
LTCs modelled in this analysis), with prices predominantly based on the oil price 
escalation (indexation) mechanism (see IGU, 2015). Long-term gas purchase 
contracts are complex documents with a number of clauses that can be extremely 
challenging to represent in the model. Taking this into account, we only model LTCs 
by specifying three important features of these contracts: (i) annual contract quantity 
(ACQ) agreed between the buyer and seller, (ii) minimum annual take-or-pay level 
and (iii) pricing mechanism. Thus, if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼 is the profit of the seller from selling gas to 
                                                          
27 We also perform sensitivity analyses and assume that low-cost producers can export up to 300 
bcm/year by 2035. In another round of sensitivity analyses we assume unlimited export potential. 
These sensitivity analyses are designed to stress test our results and should not be viewed as an 
attempt to forecast the production and export potential of the Middle East, US and other potential 
market entrants. 
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the buyer, b, under contract i and if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵 is the profit of the buyer, b, from reselling the 
gas imported under contract i, then in the simplest form and abstracting away from 
many features of the real contracts, we have the following profit functions: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 − C) (6) 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆∗ − 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶) (7) 
s.t.  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄 (8) 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄, (9) 
 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is the actual annual offtake volume, which cannot exceed the agreed ACQ 
(Eq. 8) but cannot be less than the agreed minimum take-or-pay level (coefficient 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, 
representing an annual percentage of the ACQ, Eq. 9), 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶  is the contract price, C is an 
exogenous parameter representing total supply cost and 𝑆𝑆∗(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖) is the clearing 
price in a particular traded market, which depends on supply and demand 
conditions, infrastructure capacity availability and possible endogenous mark-ups by 
traders due to pricing power. LTCs are one way for producers and importers to have 
quasi-vertical integration without embracing formal integration due to various legal 
and other considerations (such as competition law preventing such an explicit 
integration). Thus, in the old model of governance of the gas industry in Europe, 
producers and importers entered into these bilateral contracts and used the contract 
price, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶, as a mechanism to divide the entire rent ‘from wellhead to burner tip’ 
available to them from producing, transporting and selling gas to final customers in 
Europe (see Smeers, 2008 for a detailed discussion of these issues). Formally, by 
combining Eq. 6 and 7 we have the combined profit, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼, available for a producer and 
importer from entering into contract i: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆∗ − C) (10) 
s.t.  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄 (11) 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄 (12) 
 
Note that since 𝑆𝑆∗(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖) is a function of the total supplies into that market, large 
suppliers realising the effects of supplies on market prices may supply to that market 
less (but within the bounds of the specified offtake volumes, Eq. 11 and 12), thereby 
raising prices above marginal costs. Pricing power is explicitly modelled in our global 
gas market model (see Appendixes 2 and 3 for more details). 
When the contract price, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶, substantially deviates from the market price, 𝑆𝑆∗, the 
pricing and other terms (such as the minimum take-or-pay level) can be re-
negotiated between the seller and the buyer. The deviation in the two prices may 
happen as a result of supply and demand shocks in the oil and gas markets; in the 
last five years, the European gas industry has seen numerous examples of such 
contract renegotiations.  
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One factor that could lead to substantial deviation between contract prices and 
market prices is increase in oil prices (especially in 2010–2014 period). As noted 
earlier, one pricing mechanism that has been the dominant form of gas pricing in 
Europe is oil price indexation. Therefore, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶  is usually a function of crude oil prices 
and/or its derivatives (gasoil and fuel oil). Each LTC has its own unique pricing 
formula, and for our analyses it would be ideal to have information about the pricing 
of each contract that Gazprom has with European buyers. However, this information 
is confidential. Therefore, we use the average oil-indexed contract price, which is 
approximated using the following formula, as suggested by Stern and Rogers (2014): 
𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 = 0.666667 + 0.007619𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 + 0.008571𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹, (13) 
 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 is the average oil-indexed gas price, 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 is the average of the 
previous nine months’ gas oil prices (in $/tonne) and 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 is the average of the 
previous nine months’ fuel oil prices (in $/tonne). Furthermore, linear relationships 
exist between gas oil and fuel oil prices and crude oil price (Brent). The estimated 
relationship is as follows28: 
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 8.5333𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 5.3868 (14) 
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 5.9347𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 − 24.857, (15) 
 
where 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 is the Brent oil price in $/bbl and this price is based on our oil price 
scenarios (Figure 8). 
Thus, if 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶 ≫ 𝑆𝑆∗, then we assume that 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶will be brought in line with 𝑆𝑆∗by directly 
reflecting 𝑆𝑆∗ in the contract price as follows: 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆∗ + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵, (16) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼 = [0; 1] is the weight or share of market prices directly influencing the 
contract price. Furthermore, the practice of gas contract renegotiation in Europe in 
the last five years shows that apart from introducing market prices directly into the 
contract price formula, buyers and sellers also agreed to adjust the level of contract 
prices to eliminate any price differentials between contract and market prices as well 
as to reduce the minimum take-or-pay level, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖. For our analyses, in the subsequent 
sections we consider only two possible means of contract renegotiation: (i) 
introducing a higher level of market prices, i.e. increasing 𝛼𝛼 and/or (ii) reducing the 
minimum offtake level, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖. Note that when 𝛼𝛼 = 1, contract prices are 100% 
determined by market prices, and hence, any differences in the levels of the two 
prices automatically adjust such that contract prices equal and perfectly correlate 
                                                          
28 Linear regressions were run between gasoil/fuel oil and Brent crude oil monthly prices to determine 
these equations (14) and (15). All data were taken from the Bloomberg Terminal.  
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with market prices. This is the case for full spot-gas-price indexation, where oil prices 
no longer determine gas contract prices. 
As for our reference scenario, we assume that the average contract price Gazprom 
charges European importers under existing LTCs has a 10% share of market prices 
(i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = 10%29), while the average for the minimum take-or-pay level for all its 
contracts is assumed to be 75% (i.e. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 75%); for example, Mitrova et al. (2015) 
assume a similar minimum offtake level for Russian gas contracts with European 
buyers. 
 
5.2.2. Sensitivity analyses  
Several important factors may impact the future of European gas markets in general 
and Russian supplies to these markets in particular: (i) oil price dynamics, (ii) long-
run PED and (iii) LTC features – minimum take-or-pay levels and pricing 
mechanisms (oil–spot indexations or a mix of the two). We maintain the view that oil 
prices will remains fairly low but recover slowly, as suggested by recent market 
expectations (Figure 8: Based on the August 2015 forward oil curve through to 
2022). 
 
Figure 8: Oil price assumptions in the model. 
                                                          
29 Gazprom estimates that in 2014 at least 6.4% of its exports to Europe were linked to market prices, 
while the rest of the export volume was determined by oil- and quasi-oil-indexed prices; see Komlev, 
S., 2015; other sources, such as Credit Suisse, estimate that at least 12% of exports from Russia are 
indexed to market prices.  
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Note: The low-oil-price scenario up to 2022 is based on the forward curve as of mid 
August 2015, as reported in the Bloomberg Terminal; the data beyond 2022 is our 
extrapolation based on this forward curve. For details of the linear equation 
describing the forward curve, see Appendix 3. 
 
However, the results of the modelling exercise depend on the input parameters and 
assumptions we make; therefore, to test the robustness of our results and 
conclusions we also perform a systematic sensitivity analysis with different 
parameters of the factors mentioned. In particular, we test Scenarios A–D against a 
set of different assumptions about (i) future oil price dynamics (see Figure 8), (ii) 
long-run PED and (iii) the minimum take-or-pay level of Gazprom’s existing LTCs 
with European buyers (for details of these contracts, see Appendix 3). For the high-
oil-price scenario, we double the slope of the forward curve, meaning that the oil 
price will recover twice as fast as the price in the reference case (and real market 
expectation as of August 2015) (see Appendix 3 for details), reaching the 2010–2014 
average price level by 2030. In the low-oil-price scenario we assume an oil price 
world of $50/bbl from 2020 onwards. 
In the next section we report the main findings of this quantitative analysis. 
Table 5: Elasticities and take-or-pay levels for sensitivity analyses. 
PED Minimum take-or-pay (ToP) level (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)30 
1. Very inelastic: -0.1 1. Minimal take-or-pay level: ToP=10% 
2. Reference scenario: -0.223 2. High degree of flexibility: ToP=25% 
3. Moderately inelastic: -0.75 3. Some degree of flexibility: ToP=50% 
4. Unit elasticity: -1 4. Reference scenario: ToP=75% 
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Why Gazprom should adopt an ISTM strategy 
Gazprom should not pursue a border sales strategy because this strategy generally 
leads to inferior results in terms of profitability: compared to ISTM, the border sales 
strategy results in substantially lower profits. For example, in the reference case, if 
Gazprom adopts a border sales strategy, its export volumes will increase, placing 
downward pressure on spot prices. In this case, Gazprom’s potential loss of profits 
under the border sales strategy compared to ISTM would be roughly $2.4 bn/year 
over 25 years.31 The potential loss arising from the border sales strategy compared to 
ISTM model could be as low as $1.7 bn/year and as high as $15.6 bn/year (NPV), 
depending on various factors that we discuss in detail below. In other words, for 
every thousand cubic metres of export sales, the ISTM strategy could bring 
                                                          
30 For the sake of brevity, we undertake the scenario analysis for the take-or-pay parameter assuming 
our reference scenario. 
31 This calculation takes into account the contract price with a 90/10 split between oil and spot 
indexation for all existing contract sales and additional sales under the border sales strategy at a 
competitive price (marginal cost of supply). 
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additional profit of $11–99, assuming an average of 158 bcm/year in sales to Europe 
(as in 2010–2014). Thus, the benefit of the ISTM model is that in this situation the 
optimal export strategy takes into account not only prices and marginal supply costs 
but also the price-quantity responsiveness (i.e. PED) of the markets. Ignoring the 
information about PED translates Gazprom’s border sales strategy into price-taking 
behaviour, thereby supplying European markets until prices equate to marginal 
supply costs. Since Gazprom’s production costs are some of the lowest in Europe, 
this price-taking behaviour results in lower (spot) prices, thus undermining 
Gazprom’s contract prices as well as spot sales. By contrast, one strategic benefit of 
ISTM is that it allows Gazprom to supply European markets with the ‘correct’ 
amount of gas, which depends on PED. Thus, the benefit of the ISTM sales strategy is 
that it does not flood the markets with relatively cheap gas, which would undermine 
Gazprom’s profitability. This is the basic economic value of ISTM compared to the 
border sales strategy. Importantly, however, ISTM also has strategic and options 
values for Gazprom, which we will discuss below. 
 
5.3.1.1. Resilience to contract price renegotiation 
If Gazprom opted for a border sales strategy, it would endanger its own contract 
position because the difference between the average oil-indexed contract price 
(assuming a 90/10 split between oil and spot indexation) and settled market prices in 
Europe is quite large in all three oil price scenarios; only in a world of $50/bbl oil 
price would the oil-linked contract price be cheaper than spot prices, albeit the 
contract price would still be marginally higher than spot prices until 2030 (see 
Figure 9). In this situation, the border sales strategy would ‘cannibalise’ Gazprom’s 
export profits. Furthermore, given its history of contract renegotiations with 
European buyers during 2010–2014, Gazprom would be forced to renegotiate 
contracts once again, with the potential outcome of adjusting base contract prices 
and moving towards full market price indexation in its contracts in order to eliminate 
price differentials. Apart from the scenario of low oil prices (i.e. $50/bbl over 2015–
2035), the situation with price differentials in favour of market prices is, in general, 
insensitive to either border sales (see Figure 9) or ISTM (see Figure 14). 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is an increasingly high risk of contract price 
renegotiation as we move forward into an oversupply market environment. 
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Figure 9: Differences between average oil-indexed contract and hub prices under the 
border sales strategy (reference scenario). 
 
Thus, if the risk of re-contracting is high and increasing spot indexation in 
Gazprom’s contracts is inevitable (as discussed in the next section), our results 
(Figure 10) suggest that Gazprom should adopt the ISTM sales strategy. 
 
Figure 10: The value of the ISTM vs border sales strategy under risk of re-
contracting: Price renegotiation (reference scenario). 
 
In this situation, the ISTM sales strategy could generate additional profit of at least 
$2.4 bn/year (NPV) under status quo pricing (90/10 oil–spot split), and this value 
rises as the share of spot indexation in Gazprom’s contracts increases, reaching $6.1 
bn/year in additional profit under full market price (hub) indexation.  
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Furthermore, when contract prices are higher than spot prices, buyers could demand 
that Gazprom reduces the minimum take-or-pay level (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖). Indeed, it is understood 
that Algerian Sonatrach agreed to reduce the minimum offtake level substantially in 
exchange for preserving oil indexation in its contracts with Italian importers. Thus, 
should Gazprom make concessions to its buyers and reduce the minimum take-or-
pay level in exchange for a status quo pricing structure (90/10 oil–spot indexation), 
this would lead to a substantial reduction in its export profits if the company pursued 
the border sales strategy: at a 50% minimum take-or-pay level, its profit would be 
reduced by around $2.2 bn/year, while profits would shrinks to $9.4 bn/year (from 
$14.0 bn/year) under extreme conditions of minimum take-or-pay, i.e. 10% of ACQs. 
By contrast, under the ISTM sale strategy Gazprom’s export profit would be 
substantially higher under all examined take-or-pay levels (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: The value of the ISTM vs border sales strategy under the risk of re-
contracting: Minimum take-or-pay renegotiation (reference scenario).  
Thus, the value of ISTM as a hedge against possible contract renegotiations is fairly 
high for Gazprom. At the same time, the cost of implementing the ISTM strategy 
would be fairly negligible since Gazprom, as noted before, already has a presence in 
wholesale trading in Europe (e.g. through its trading arm, Gazprom Marketing and 
Trading, in London). 
 
5.3.1.2. Resilience to the entry of low-cost gas producers 
As noted, the global gas markets are likely to be oversupplied in the next five to ten 
years, with increasing competition between ‘upstreamers’. This will inevitably put 
more pressure on the oil price indexation in existing LTCs. This situation could be 
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exacerbated by the potential entry of low-cost producers into the global gas trade; as 
these producers would flood the markets with cheap gas, the average oil-indexed 
contract price, a proxy for Gazprom’s average contract price, could be even more 
expensive than spot prices. Thus, low-cost producers’ entry into global trade would 
further incentivise European buyers to renegotiate their contracts with Gazprom, 
demanding adjustments to base-price levels and also pushing for more spot 
indexation (see price differentials in Figure 12). This would negatively affect 
Gazprom’s potential profits even further, should the company choose a border sales 
strategy. For example, if low-cost producers enter the markets, the losses to Gazprom 
under the border sales strategy could be as much as $1.5 bn/year if all contracts are 
fully adjusted and indexed to spot prices. 
 
Figure 12: Differences between average oil-indexed contract and hub prices under 
the border sales strategy: Impact of low-cost producers (reference scenario). 
By contrast, the ISTM sales strategy would ensure that if Gazprom’s contracts were 
fully adjusted and indexed to spot (market) prices when low-cost producers entered 
the markets, then Gazprom would receive substantially higher profits: when 
contracts are 100% spot indexed, ISTM results in $5.6 bn/year more in profit than 
under the border sales strategy (Figure 13). Not surprisingly, the net benefit of ISTM 
is lower if the share of spot indexation is low (10%) – $1.9 bn/year – because higher 
prices under ISTM are not ‘passed along’ fully through Gazprom’s contract prices. 
Note that market entry by low-cost producers could generally have a negative impact 
on the value of ISTM: the net benefit would be $5.6 bn/year, compared to $6.1 
bn/year when low-cost producers do not enter the markets (Figure 10). This is 
primarily due to the lower spot prices towards the end of the 2030s, when gas 
production and exports from low-cost producers should be fully ramped up. 
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Nevertheless, the ISTM strategy would in any case generate substantially higher 
profits for Gazprom than the border sales strategy in all market scenarios: oil price 
dynamics, possible configurations of contract pricing and minimum offtake 
structures (oil–spot indexation and minimum take-or-pay levels) or the potential 
entry of low-cost producers. 
 
 
Figure 13: The economic value of the ISTM vs border sales strategy under the risk of 
re-contracting and the entrance of low-cost competitors (reference scenario).  
In fact, the ISTM strategy would not only generate higher profits for Gazprom but 
also reduce the risk of re-contracting (such as price and volume renegotiation): the 
differential between the average oil-indexed contract price and spot prices in north-
west Europe would be substantially lower (Figure 14). Under the ISTM strategy, 
contract prices would be even lower than spot prices when oil prices stay at $50/bbl, 
which is not entirely unrealistic. 
However, when oil prices are that low ($50/bbl) Gazprom may face strong economic 
incentives to switch all of its contracts to full spot indexation as this would ensure 
higher profits than sticking with the 90/10 split between oil indexation (with a low 
oil price of $50/bbl) and spot indexation. By contrast, if oil prices were high, 
Gazprom would have an incentive to minimise the exposure to spot indexation; 
however, this may not be a credible strategy given its (negative) experience with price 
renegotiation with European buyers over 2010–2014, when hub prices were 
substantially lower than Gazprom’s contract prices (Figure 14: solid and dashed 
curve). If oil prices rose to fairly high levels (e.g. as in the high-oil-price scenario), it 
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would be even more difficult (compared to 2010–2014) for Gazprom to oppose 
contract price adjustments and move towards full market price indexation, given the 
increasing competition from low-cost producers (committed US LNG export projects 
as well as LNG from Iran, Kurdistan, Qatar, Australia and East Africa). 
 
Figure 14: Differences between average oil-indexed contract and hub prices under 
the ISTM strategy (reference scenario). 
This result suggests that under the ISTM sales strategy, Gazprom has strong 
economic incentives to switch to full spot indexation, either because of the higher 
profits this strategy would allow (Figure 15: low-oil-price scenario) or the need to 
accommodate buyers’ requests to adjust contract prices and introduce a higher share 
of spot indexation, as buyers may find spot prices cheaper than oil-indexed contract 
prices when oil prices are high (Figure 15: reference and high-oil-price scenarios). 
To summarise, the border sales strategy is always inferior to the ISTM strategy in 
that it gives Gazprom substantially lower export profit. Furthermore, when ISTM is 
considered, it appears that a move towards a higher share of spot indexation would 
be a profit-maximising strategy in all of the oil price scenarios considered. Thus, in 
the rest of this paper we consider that increasing spot indexation in Gazprom’s 
contracts is economically more justifiable as this results in higher profits. Therefore, 
in the following sections we discuss the impact of ISTM on Gazprom profits 
assuming full spot indexation.32 
                                                          
32 Results under the assumption of 15% (and 50%) shares of spot indexation in Gazprom’s contracts 
are available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 15: Gazprom’s annual export profit under the ISTM model and different oil 
price scenarios and shares of spot indexation (reference scenario). 
 
5.3.1.3. Capturing higher value when (downstream) markets are 
competitive 
Apart from hedging against the downside of possible changes in pricing structures as 
well as higher upstream competition (entry of low-cost producers), ISTM can also 
better capture the upside from increased competition in downstream markets, either 
because of increased inter-fuel competition (cheap coal and subsidised renewables) 
or increased gas-to-gas competition. Increased downstream competition translates 
into higher market price responsiveness (i.e. PED). In a highly competitive market, a 
1% increase in price leads to a greater than 1% reduction in the quantity demanded at 
that price (i.e. |PED|>1). This is possible if buyers can easily switch and have access 
to alternative fuels (coal or renewables in electricity generation) and/or to global 
LNG and liquid spot markets for sourcing cheaper gas options. In fact, in this 
situation, the net benefit of ISTM for Gazprom increases as downstream competition 
rises (Figure 16): in a less competitive market situation (|PED|=0.1), the ISTM 
strategy generates $6.3–7.8 bn/year in additional profit compared to the border 
sales strategy, depending on oil price dynamics. As markets become more 
competitive, the ISTM strategy could generate $1.7–3.0 bn/year more profit than 
under the border sales strategy (Figure 16: grey bars). 
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Figure 16: Net benefit of ISTM relative to the border sales strategy under increased 
downstream market competition and full spot indexation (reference scenario). 
The driver behind this additional profit growth is that sales under the ISTM strategy 
take into account important information about market conditions – PED, or the state 
of downstream market competition. Therefore, Gazprom exports the ‘correct’ 
amount of gas at the best price it can achieve given all other market and industry 
conditions, such as competitors’ responses, cost structures and physical capacities.  
 
5.3.1.4. Option value of the ISTM strategy 
We can summarise the costs and benefits of the two sales strategies as follows: 
1. The border sales strategy is beneficial when the objective is to maximise sales 
quantity and not profit from those sales. Although this may carry some market 
reputational value for Gazprom (such as becoming a market leader), it has many 
downsides, including: (i) that increased sales quantity could lead to higher 
investment costs for developing increasingly challenging and remote gas fields, 
which could overheat Russia’s economy as well as the opportunity cost of 
regulated domestic prices; and (ii) the opportunity costs of missing potentially 
higher profits from alternative, albeit more sophisticated, sales strategies such as 
ISTM. 
2. The ISTM strategy focuses on maximising the value of Gazprom’s gas reserves, 
which does not necessarily coincide with maximising sales quantity. Indeed, the 
profit-maximising sales strategy appears to be that which limits gas sales to raise 
prices sufficiently high given all market conditions, such as pricing structure 
(oil–spot indexation), oil price dynamics and the state of upstream and 
downstream market competition. In each of these scenarios (and we have run 
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multiple scenarios totalling 216 simulations with our global gas market model to 
check the robustness of our claims and results), ISTM is the superior sales 
strategy. As such, ISTM is both a hedge and a profit-maximising strategy. 
Figure 17 summarises these benefits of ISTM quantitatively compared to those of the 
border sales strategy under the reference oil price scenario. Assuming 90/10 oil–spot 
indexation and a 75% minimum take-or-pay level, the border sales strategy would 
generate $14.0 bn/year (NPV) in total export profit, while ISTM would generate 
$16.4 bn/year, $2.3 bn more than the export profit under border sales. As noted, the 
basic value of ISTM under the current pricing structure (10% indexation) comes from 
the fact that under ISTM, Gazprom’s optimal export strategy would take into account 
not only prices and marginal supply costs but also PED. 
In addition to its basic economic value, ISTM has option value in that it could 
potentially shield Gazprom from the negative impact of market dynamics. We have 
shown that it would be increasingly difficult for Gazprom to defend the current LTC 
structure (pricing and minimum take-or-pay levels) regime because in most cases, 
Gazprom’s oil-indexed prices are expected to be higher than spot prices (Figure 9 
and Figure 14). In this situation, Gazprom’s export profits under the border sales 
strategy would decrease substantially: under 50% spot indexation, the total profit 
would fall from $14.0 bn/year to $12.3 bn/year (NPV), and this would fall further to 
$10.2 bn/year in the case of full spot indexation. If low-cost producers entered the 
international gas trade, thus depressing spot prices further (Figure 12), then 
Gazprom’s export profit could fall as low as $8.5 bn/year under full hub indexation. 
Thus, the option value of the ISTM strategy is the difference between what Gazprom 
could achieve by pursuing the border sales strategy under the current contractual 
regime – $14.0 bn/year – and what it might actually receive should pricing and 
market structure changes go against their favour (higher spot indexation in its oil-
indexed contracts and the entry of low-cost producers) (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17: Gazprom’s export profit under the border sales and ISTM strategies and 
different market scenarios (reference scenario). 
Note:* we assume a 75% minimum take-or-pay level and 90/10 oil–spot indexation 
for existing LTC structures; ** For example, if downstream markets become more 
competitive, as represented by the value of the price elasticity of demand, ISTM 
captures more value than border sales strategy would allow. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: ISTM’s option value and upside potential (reference scenario). 
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50 
 
Thus, the option value of the ISTM strategy increases as pressure from buyers to 
increase the spot indexation in existing contracts builds up. Should the buyers and 
Gazprom agree to 50% (100%) spot indexation, the option value of ISTM would 
reach $1.7 ($3.8) bn/year (NPV) (see Figure 18). In the case of low-cost producers 
entering the markets, the option value of ISTM would be the highest: $5.1 bn/year 
(NPV), which reflects the downside of the border sales strategy when low-cost 
producers enter the markets. 
ISTM can also capture the upside potential, increasing Gazprom’s annual export 
profit substantially and above what Gazprom could achieve by pursuing the border 
sales strategy. Under 50% (100%) spot indexation, if Gazprom adopted ISTM, the 
upside potential could give Gazprom additional profits of $2.3 ($5.6) bn/year (NPV) 
(Figure 18: grey bars). This upside potential includes ISTM’s ability to price 
Gazprom’s produced gas actively in traded markets (similar to Statoil’s sales and 
production strategy from its swing capacity, the Troll and Oseberg fields), and this 
upside potential increases further if downstream markets become more competitive. 
The results of our quantitative analysis were based on running the global gas market 
model for various market scenarios (216 in total). These market scenarios represent a 
combination of possible oil price dynamics, the state of downstream market 
competition, possible structures of existing LTCs and scales of entry for low-cost gas 
producers. The intention behind analysing these market scenarios is to ‘stress test’ 
the two sales strategies and understand their abilities and limitations in maximising 
the value of gas exports for Gazprom. In no way should these scenarios be viewed as 
market dynamics forecasts. Instead, these scenarios, or combinations thereof, should 
be viewed as ‘grey swan’-type of events, which while having a fairly low (but positive) 
probability until a chain of unforeseen events triggers their realisation could still 
dramatically affect Gazprom’s bottom line. The ISTM strategy gives Gazprom the 
flexibility and optionality to shield against these negative market scenarios by being 
able to ‘chop off’ the negative part of the ‘fat-tail’ distribution of Gazprom’s 
profitability under a range of future market developments. Figure 19 explains this 
argument more conceptually assuming that instead of 216 scenarios the two sales 
strategies were tested against thousands of different scenarios. Thus, by limiting the 
impact of negative market developments on the range of possible profitability, the 
ISTM strategy either ‘alters’ market expectations of Gazprom’s profitability further to 
the right, away from negative events, or increases Gazprom’s expected profitability. 
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Figure 19: Flexibility and optionality provided by the ISTM sales strategy 
 
6. Discussion 
We have looked at the strategic benefits of an ISTM sales strategy and the optionality 
that it would give Gazprom in an increasingly liberalised and complex gas market. In 
addition to its strategic value, ISTM may also bring other benefits, such as capturing 
additional margins by going further downstream, introducing structured and tailored 
products to suit the needs of market participants and, hence, the ability to price 
discriminate depending on customers’ preferences towards volume and price 
certainty or flexibility (see Section 4). All things considered, the ISTM strategy would 
be better for Gazprom in terms of generating higher export profits than the border 
sales strategy while allowing Gazprom to react to changing market dynamics more 
optimally. In this section we argue that a gradual switch to spot indexation and 
channelling growing export volumes33 through a single marketing and trading 
division (like Statoil’s MMP) would not only be a profit-maximising strategy for 
Gazprom (and other large exporters to Europe) but would also fit with the recently 
established market structure and regulations in Europe. We also argue that a 
combination of the ISTM strategy, spot indexation and trading liquidity could be a 
substitute for the traditional long-term bilateral oil-indexed contracts that existed 
before recent renegotiations. 
A. The role of contracts and markets along the European gas value 
chain 
                                                          
33 Either because of additional demand in Europe for Russian gas or because of a reduction in 
minimum take-or-pay levels for its existing contracts. 
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As discussed in Section 3, the rationale for long-term bilateral contracts, among 
other things, is to deal with the possibility of opportunistic behaviour, to minimise 
transaction costs and to secure financing for investment.  
As noted, opportunism may arise when relationship-specific investments must be 
realised before trade can occur, and in such situations, both parties may exercise 
their bargaining power to expropriate quasi-rents arising from sunk investments. 
However, since the late 1990s, the European gas industry has undergone substantial 
changes, among which are the introductions of gas transport regulations and open 
access to infrastructure capacity. This has meant that the level of transaction-specific 
investment in bilateral contracts has been reduced, and hence, the rationale for large 
and relationship-specific contracts between upstream and downstream players to 
cover both commodity and national transmission pipeline and storage capacity has 
been diminished or removed entirely (we come back to the question of international 
pipelines later). Put differently, the introduction of regulations for transport 
infrastructure and third-party access has meant that sellers can supply gas to any 
potential customer taking into account the cost of transport and the degree of 
upstream competition. Even if a producer is connected to potential buyers through 
only one pipeline, that pipeline tariff is now regulated, and hence, the tariff policy 
cannot be used to expropriate a producer’s quasi-rents. The empirical evidence in 
Section 3.3 points to the fact that after the introduction of regulatory model for gas 
transport infrastructure in Europe, the average duration34 of LTCs has been 
significantly reduced, reflecting the lower levels of asset specificity associated with 
the introduction of gas infrastructure regulations in Europe. 
Furthermore, as a result of the structural changes in regulations and market 
organisation, there are now two types of organised trading markets in Europe: one 
for gas commodity (such as NBP and TTF) and another for gas capacity (such as the 
gas capacity trading platform PRISMA, which began in late 2015) (Figure 20). As the 
spot and futures trading of gas commodity and capacity increases, bilateral LTCs are 
becoming redundant as a means of minimising transaction costs because prices are 
established transparently through multiple trades in these organised markets. 
Therefore, spot markets are expected to replace bilateral LTCs as a device for 
minimising the cost of price negotiations and searching for trading partners as 
liquidity increases and markets deepen. This in turn will increase the volatility of 
spot and short-term prices, creating demand for hedging products and, therefore, 
uptake in futures markets. Thus, both spot and futures markets allow individual 
market players to hedge their positions according to their preferences and the nature 
of their business without the need to commit to rigid bilateral LTCs. Thus, for risk-
sharing and hedging purposes, spot and futures prices should guide investment 
decisions and hedging strategies. 
                                                          
34 A metric measuring the level of asset specificity. 
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This does not necessarily mean that there will be no role for bilateral long-term 
(forward) contracts between producers and buyers (power generators and industrial 
customers or aggregators and resellers) for gas commodity or between producers 
(buyers) and transmission and storage system operators for transport and storage 
capacities (Figure 20). However, the role of the bilateral forward contract will no 
longer be to safeguard against opportunism. Instead, the purpose of these forward 
contracts will be to give some assurance to market players who seek alternative 
hedging products to those proposed in the organised spot and futures markets. The 
need for such contracts would depend on the effectiveness of organised spot and 
futures markets in delivering risk-management options to market participants. 
 
Figure 20: Organisation of the gas value chain in Europe: Physical flows, contracts 
and markets. 
Thus, going forward, both forms of gas trade organisation may co-exist in Europe. 
Organised spot and futures markets as well as bilateral forward contracts and the 
balance between the two will depend on their effectiveness in providing market 
participants with risk-management options and the possibility of minimising 
transaction costs. 
Industry 
Commercial 
Power gen. 
Residential 
Exploration 
and 
 
International 
pipelines 
National 
transmission 
Distribution 
network 
Storage 
Spot/futures 
market 
LNG 
Spot/futures commodity 
transactions 
Organised 
capacity markets 
Physical gas flows 
Forward bilateral 
commodity contracts 
Spot/futures capacity 
transactions 
Gas commodity risk management 
Gas capacity risk management 
Forward bilateral 
capacity contracts 
54 
 
As noted, prices in the organised markets are set transparently through multiple 
trades and are subject to supply and demand conditions as well as participants’ 
expectations. This, in turn, reduces transaction costs for those who choose to 
participate in these markets. As such, an interesting issue (and perhaps the most 
debated one) is the pricing mechanism that should be used in forward bilateral 
contracts when spot and futures markets are well established. We consider this 
question next. 
B. Forward bilateral contracts 
B.1. Pricing mechanisms 
Joskow (1988) discusses three forms of pricing in bilateral LTCs, analysing coal 
supply contracts as a case study: (i) fixed-price contracts, (ii) escalating-price 
contracts and (iii) market-price contracts. Joskow suggested that fixed-price 
contracts have poor properties in that they almost always incentivise the parties to 
breach and renegotiate a contract when uncertain events occur that lead to costs or 
price increases or decreases that differ markedly from expected values at the time of 
signing. According to Joskow, escalating-price contracts, and ‘base price plus 
escalation’ in particular, have good properties in that they closely track changes in 
producers’ input prices as well as general productivity changes affecting other gas 
producers and thus minimise the risk of non-compliance and contract 
renegotiations. However, escalating-price contracts cannot isolate parties from the 
breaches and haggling that arise because of demand-side or supply-side shocks, 
which produce substantial differences between contract prices and the market value 
of gas. In this regard, recent price renegotiations between European buyers and 
major gas producers are evidence of this argument. Indeed, as Joskow highlights, 
neither fixed-price nor escalating-price contracts can deal with unanticipated shocks. 
In this regard, bilateral LTCs with prices pegged to spot and futures market prices 
are the only contracts that can properly insulate contracting parties from haggling 
arising from unanticipated shocks that would change short- and long-run 
equilibriums. The only downside of market price contracts, as Joskow notes, is that if 
these bilateral forward contracts have a substantial level of ‘embedded’ relationship-
specific investment, then the hold-up problem may still arise in that market prices 
will not reflect fully sunk costs should the parties terminate the contracts 
prematurely. 
Thus, if bilateral forward contracts were to exist along with traded markets, then the 
appropriate pricing mechanism that would minimise the cost of haggling would be 
market-based pricing or spot indexation. We documented extensively in Section 3 
how the level of relationship-specific investment has been reduced dramatically due 
to the fall in the cost of transport technologies and, most importantly, the regulatory 
regime developed around gas transportation, including regulated tariff setting and 
third-party access. Furthermore, due to the maturity of the gas markets in Europe, 
no major surge in gas demand is expected, and hence, no major investments are 
required from the buyers’ side. Going forward, gas import needs may increase in 
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Europe because of (i) a fall in indigenous supplies and (ii), for example, switching 
from coal to gas in the power-generation sector due to climate and environmental 
requirements. However, these import requirements do not need the specific (capital-
intensive) investments that were required in the early days of gas penetration, when 
capital investments were required to ‘gasify’ large areas of Europe. Therefore, spot 
indexation in forward bilateral contracts would be an efficient pricing mechanism 
reflecting the established regulatory regime and market realities in Europe. 
Furthermore, the rationale for these forward contracts would be mainly to deal with 
price and volume risk management. For example, one may expect that in a tight 
market environment, a buyer may pay a premium for a guaranteed volume that 
cannot be obtained through traded markets or, indeed, the seller may give a discount 
to ensure that a minimum volume is sold, perhaps because the seller anticipates 
entry from a competitor and thus an oversupplied market. 
All in all, forward bilateral contracts may co-exist with traded markets; however, to 
avoid costly haggling, these contracts will need an increasing share of spot indexation 
rather than oil indexation, which does not reflect the realities of European gas 
market dynamics today. 
B.2. Take-or-pay minimum and financing infrastructure 
As noted, the take-or-pay clause that would ensure the minimum offtake level may be 
required if gas trade is undertaken using new infrastructure. Going forward, we 
would, however, expect that these contracts would have a rather low level of 
minimum take-or-pay. For example, one could expect that import contracts linked to 
investments in bypass pipelines that would ensure secure gas transport from Russia 
to Europe may have minimum take-or-pay clauses. These bypass pipelines may 
require large upfront investments. But again, the primary purpose of these bilateral 
contracts between Gazprom and European buyers would be to minimise the cost of 
borrowing to finance the pipeline, not to shield parties from opportunism. For 
example, Gazprom may wish to set a minimum take-or-pay level that would be just 
enough to guarantee stable repayment of debts over a period of time required by the 
lenders, while the rest of the volume through the new pipeline could be channelled 
through Gazprom’s single trading and marketing division (just like Statoil’s MMP). 
In this way, as our modelling results suggest, Gazprom’s export profit would be 
maximised. 
C. Implications for Gazprom’s export strategy to Europe 
Our results suggest that Gazprom has a fairly simple choice to make with respect to 
its future sales strategy in Europe: would it like to receive higher profits for its 
government and shareholders than those given by its status quo sales strategy? If the 
answer is ‘yes’, then it would make sense for Gazprom to gradually channel 
increasing volumes of gas through a single trading and marketing division that would 
actively participate in wholesale commodity and capacity trading, reflecting all the 
benefits this trading division could bring to Gazprom, as discussed in Section 5. 
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Moreover, other alternative sales and pricing strategies would be detrimental to 
Gazprom’s position in Europe (see Section 5). 
Our results and discussions do not, however, exclude traditional bilateral LTCs, 
which may well co-exist with the traded markets if demand for such contracts exists. 
The costs and benefits of entering into such forward contracts would depend on 
market dynamics (e.g. tight vs oversupply) and the degree of competition (both 
downstream and upstream). As such, having a trading and marketing division 
responsible for the majority of sales would help Gazprom to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of these bilateral contracts comprehensively and, therefore, devise an 
optimal sales and pricing structure. 
As for the dilemma between oil and spot indexation, should Gazprom wish to have oil 
indexation as a pricing mechanism for a portion of its produced gas, then it could do 
so. It could sign LTCs with its single export and trading division (just like the transfer 
price between Statoil’s production division and Statoil’s trading division, see Section 
4) and agree that the pricing in these contracts (transfer price) would be pegged to oil 
and oil products, or to any other product that Gazprom’s production division 
chooses. Then, the invoice price or realised market price would be set by the trading 
and marketing division based on, for example, market dynamics and Gazprom’s 
overall strategic interests. Aside from the Statoil example, there are other examples 
of such intra-company pricing policies. For example, we understand that the pricing 
of Total’s equity production from Yamal LNG will be fully indexed to oil (as Total, 
being a major oil producer, wants to have this hedge) and that all the equity volume 
will be sold to Total’s trading arm, which in turn will trade and market LNG under 
market price conditions.35 
One important issue to highlight is that as markets mature and transactions take 
place through traded markets, the ISTM business model will become a hedging tool 
for those producers who want to optimise production and sales portfolios as well as 
actively price their gas commodity. In a nutshell, ISTM is becoming a substitute for a 
system of bilateral contracts to extract more economic rents for Gazprom’s gas 
reserves. Rent extraction used to be conducted through bilateral contracts and 
bargaining between few buyers and sellers, but in traded markets, rent generation is 
possible only with the adoption of an ISTM sales strategy.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this research paper we have shown that the role of long-term contracts (LTCs) 
with oil indexation as a pricing mechanism is declining and that the establishment of 
spot market trading as a dominant form of gas trade governance is imminent in 
Europe. We have discussed within the framework of transaction cost economics the 
                                                          
35 Based on our private discussions with a Total representative. 
57 
 
reasons why LTCs were signed in the early days of the European gas industry and the 
reasons why their role is now diminishing rapidly. The collapse of the system of 
bilateral contracts is due to a substantial decrease in the level of asset specificity that 
facilitated gas trade in the first place. This decrease in asset specificity is due to (i) 
liberalisation and the introduction of pipeline regulations in Europe and (ii) the 
reduction in capital intensiveness of transport technologies, allowing more entry into 
the market, particularly from LNG players. The role of LTCs may co-exist with 
organised trading markets as long as there is demand and supply for such contracts. 
However, the primarily role of these rigid bilateral forward contracts will be to 
manage price and volume risks as well as to minimise the cost of financing new 
infrastructure.  
In light of these fundamental changes in market environment, we investigated the 
alternative sales strategies available for oil and gas producers when markets are 
liberalised and become increasingly complex, rendering a simple trade model based 
on LTCs no longer fit for purpose. In particular, we focused on two types of sales 
strategies: (i) pure production and the border sales model and (ii) the integrated 
production, supply, trading and marketing model (ISTM). While investigating the 
responses of Europe’s largest gas suppliers to these structural changes, we found that 
Statoil, Norway’s largest gas producer and one of the largest suppliers to Europe, has 
quickly changed its sales strategy from passive sales and pricing to an ISTM model, 
realising that this new strategy, with increased wholesale trade and direct marketing 
activities, brings higher profits. We also found, through an extensive modelling 
exercise and the examination of more than 200 market scenarios, that should 
Gazprom adopt an ISTM sales model and, specifically, introduce a single division 
responsible for trading and marketing (just like Statoil’s marketing, midstream and 
processing – MMP – division) and increasingly channel all export volume through 
this division, its export profits would increase substantially. The ISTM sales model 
would have numerous benefits for Gazprom, as we have shown in Section 5. To 
summarise these benefits, the ISTM strategy: 
1. Fits with the current market realities and enhances Gazprom’s competitive 
advantages – as the largest gas reserve holder with comparably low costs for 
supplying to Europe – and hence its export profitability. 
2. Has options value because it gives Gazprom resilience to the negative impact 
of market and industry dynamics and shocks. Under this sales strategy, its 
export profit would be very resilient to contract renegotiations (increased spot 
indexation and lower take-or-pay levels) and the entry of low-cost producers 
into the markets. 
3. Can better capture the upside potential of market developments, increasing 
Gazprom’s annual export profit substantially and above what Gazprom could 
achieve by pursuing the border sales strategy. This upside potential includes 
ISTM’s ability to price Gazprom’s produced gas actively in traded markets, 
and this upside potential is further increased if the downstream market 
becomes more competitive 
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Thus, we can conclude that it would be rational for Gazprom to adopt an ISTM sales 
strategy and, in particular, to channel an increasing share of its export volume 
through a single trade and marketing division and switch gradually to full spot 
indexation, allowing it to enjoy the full value of the strategy. Gazprom should realise 
that the higher share of spot indexation in its existing LTCs, the higher Gazprom’s 
profits if all volumes are channelled through a single trading and marketing entity: 
profit maximisation is only guaranteed when Gazprom is involved in active trading in 
the wholesale gas commodity and capacity markets. These results are robust under 
various assumptions and market scenarios. However, even with the current 
dominance of oil indexation and take-or-pay levels (90/10 oil–spot indexation in 
Gazprom’s existing contracts), the ISTM sales strategy would bring higher value to 
Gazprom than a border sales strategy. 
Note that the obtained results related to the economic benefits of ISTM strategy 
relative to the border strategy were quantified at the macro and strategic level. 
However, there are of course other benefits of the ISTM sales strategy that are 
commonly discussed in the oil and gas industry, such as portfolio optimisation, 
operational and logistical benefits and trading with flexible and diverse products are 
not considered as part of this modelling exercise. Furthermore, our results do not 
include the value the marketing part of the ISTM model since this would require very 
detailed modelling that is beyond the scope of this paper. Marketing and further 
downstream activities include participation in the electricity generation sector, 
carbon trading, energy efficiency and other end uses of gas as an energy carrier and 
product (e.g. for the chemical industry). We leave the quantification of these other 
micro level benefits for future research. 
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Appendix 1: Simple econometric analysis of determinants of long-term 
gas contracts 
Descriptive statistics 
 N Range Min Max Sum Mean Std. dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
error 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
error 
Statistic Std. 
error 
Contract_Duration 631 37.00 5.00 42.00 11582.50 18.3558 .26198 6.58092 43.309 -.200 .097 .213 .194 
ACQ 631 29.95 .05 30.00 1414.11 2.2411 .11065 2.77946 7.725 4.899 .097 38.379 .194 
ACQ_SQRT 631 900.00 .00 900.00 8036.14 12.7356 2.3493 59.01386 3482.636 12.367 .097 172.098 .194 
NWE_EUpost98_Dummy 631 1.00 .00 1.00 64.00 .1014 .01203 .30213 .091 2.647 .097 5.021 .194 
Rof_EUpost98_Dummy 631 1.00 .00 1.00 74.00 .1173 .01282 .32200 .104 2.385 .097 3.699 .194 
Flexible_LNG_Dummy 631 1.00 .00 1.00 44.00 .0697 .01015 .25489 .065 3.387 .097 9.500 .194 
LNG_Dummy 631 1.00 .00 1.00 504.00 .7987 .01597 .40127 .161 -1.494 .097 .232 .194 
Valid N (listwise) 631             
 
Model summaryb 
Model R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std. error of the 
estimate 
Change statistics Durbin-
Watson R square change F change df1 df2 Sig. F change 
1 .359a .129 .120 6.17215 .129 15.369 6 624 .000 1.516 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LNG_Dummy, Rof_EUpost98_Dummy, Flexible_LNG_Dummy, ACQ_SQRT, NWE_EUpost98_Dummy, ACQ. 
b. Dependent variable: Contract_Duration. 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 3512.854 6 585.476 15.369 .000b 
Residual 23771.522 624 38.095   
Total 27284.376 630    
a. Dependent Variable: Contract_Duration. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LNG_Dummy, Rof_EUpost98_Dummy, Flexible_LNG_Dummy, ACQ_SQRT, 
NWE_EUpost98_Dummy, ACQ. 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardised coefficients Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% confidence 
interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
bound 
Upper bound 
 
(Constant) 19.248 .754  25.539 .000 17.768 20.728 
ACQ .836 .172 .353 4.849 .000 .497 1.174 
ACQ_SQRT -.022 .008 -.198 -2.768 .006 -.038 -.006 
NWE_EUpost98_Dummy -6.007 .867 -.276 -6.931 .000 -7.708 -4.305 
Rof_EUpost98_Dummy -1.905 .775 -.093 -2.457 .014 -3.428 -.382 
Flexible_LNG_Dummy -2.594 .976 -.100 -2.659 .008 -4.510 -.678 
LNG_Dummy -1.841 .679 -.112 -2.712 .007 -3.175 -.508 
a. Dependent Variable: Contract_Duration 
 
Coefficient correlationsa 
Model LNG_Dummy Rof_EUpost9
8_Dummy 
Flexible_LN
G_Dummy 
ACQ_SQR
T 
NWE_EUpost98_Du
mmy 
ACQ 
 
Correlations 
LNG_Dummy 1.000 .110 -.116 -.017 .295 .164 
Rof_EUpost98_Dummy .110 1.000 .033 .020 .149 .011 
Flexible_LNG_Dummy -.116 .033 1.000 -.036 -.010 .048 
ACQ_SQRT -.017 .020 -.036 1.000 .084 -.843 
NWE_EUpost98_Dummy .295 .149 -.010 .084 1.000 -.074 
ACQ .164 .011 .048 -.843 -.074 1.000 
Covariances 
LNG_Dummy .461 .058 -.077 -9.112E-005 
.174 .019 
Rof_EUpost98_Dummy .058 .601 .025 .000 .100 .001 
Flexible_LNG_Dummy -.077 .025 .952 .000 -.009 .008 
ACQ_SQRT -9.112E-005 .000 .000 6.341E-005 .001 -.001 
NWE_EUpost98_Dummy .174 .100 -.009 .001 .751 -.011 
ACQ .019 .001 .008 -.001 -.011 .030 
a. Dependent variable: Contract_Duration 
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Appendix 2: Simplified description of strategic global gas market model 
The strategic gas market model incorporates horizontal oligopolistic relationships 
between upstream producers, transmission and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipping 
network constraints and operational and investment decisions over a 25-year time 
horizon. A notable feature of the model is its ability to simulate not only perfectly 
competitive gas markets but also imperfect competition in the gas supply chain. In 
particular, for the latter, the model can take into consideration the fact that 
producers and suppliers can exercise their pricing power (market power) by 
adjusting production and supply levels, respectively, in order to raise wholesale 
prices and, hence, marginal revenue. The model is founded on basic microeconomic 
concepts and game theoretic principles, namely:  
1. Each agent in the model maximises his profit given two types of decisions – (i) 
operational (sales, dispatch) and (ii) investment (capacity expansion) – and a 
set of constraints (such as production or transmission capacity constraints) 
and endogenous actions of the other market participants.36  
2. The upstream natural gas market is concentrated. As such, there is the 
possibility for large gas producers to play the market by pushing up prices 
and, hence, profits; however, the model can also operate under a perfect 
competition mode (i.e. marginal cost pricing) by gas producers.  
We model the full gas market value chain, including the following market players and 
their corresponding competitive behaviour:  
1. gas producers – can be modelled as being imperfectly (exercising market 
power) or perfectly competitive (marginal cost pricing);  
2. gas traders – can be modelled as being imperfectly (exercising market 
power) or perfectly competitive (marginal cost pricing);  
3. pipeline transmission operator – prices pipeline transport services 
efficiently, i.e. with no market power;  
4. LNG terminal operator – prices liquefaction and regasification services 
efficiently, i.e. with no market power;  
5. LNG shipping – marginal cost-based pricing; 
6. gas storage operator – prices storage operations efficiently, i.e. with no 
market power;  
7. final markets – represented by an inverse demand curve that tells us that 
the clearance (equilibrium) price depends on total supplies to that market.  
The main outputs from this set of models are:  
• equilibrium prices and final gas consumption for all markets considered in the 
model37;  
• equilibrium prices for gas transmission services and LNG services 
(liquefaction, shipping, regasification);  
• gas trade quantities between contracted parties;  
production quantities at each production field (node) or group of fields 
(country-level aggregation);  
• storage withdrawal/injection quantities;  
• gas flows for both modes of transportation – pipeline and LNG shipping;  
                                                          
36 Note that the term ‘agent’ refers to the basic decision-making unit in the model and could denote a 
country, firm or collection of firms or countries, depending on the level of aggregation needed for the 
research project. 
37 The notion of ‘equilibrium’ prices simply means that prices are determined at the intersection of 
demand and supply. 
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• investment in production capacity;  
• investment in pipeline and LNG capacity;  
• investment in storage capacity (withdrawal, injection and working volume 
capacities).  
 
In the natural gas market modelling literature, a framework that is often used to 
model imperfect competition among market participants is the Cournot non-
cooperative game. In this game, a Nash equilibrium is a set of actions (e.g. quantity 
of gas sales) such that no market participant (player) has an incentive to deviate 
unilaterally from his own actions, taking into account his opponents’ actions. In a gas 
market model, an agent’s objective is to maximise his profit given a set of constraints 
(such as production or transmission capacity constraints). Under certain conditions, 
such as a concavity of objective functions (for maximisation problems) and convexity 
of feasible regions, the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions are both necessary 
and sufficient for the optimality of the maximisation problem. Therefore, the essence 
of modelling the gas market system is to find an equilibrium that simultaneously 
satisfies each market participant’s KKT conditions for profit maximisation and the 
market clearing conditions (supply equals demand) in the model. Due to the 
necessity and sufficiency of the KKT conditions for global optimality when the 
players’ problems are convex, this solution is a Nash equilibrium of the market game 
embodied in the model. To illustrate the underlying mathematical structure of the 
model, consider a simple problem that a gas producer may face: max
𝑞𝑞≥0
𝜋𝜋 = 𝑞𝑞𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞) (A.1) 
subject to  
𝑞𝑞 ≤ 𝑄𝑄 (𝜆𝜆), (A.2) 
where q is a sales variable, p(q) is an affine inverse demand function, C(q) is a 
production cost function such that C’(q)>0, C’’(q)>0 and Q is the producer’s 
production capacity. Then, the KKT conditions for (1) are 0 ≤ 𝑞𝑞 ⊥ 𝑆𝑆 + 𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝑞𝑞 + 𝜆𝜆 − 𝐶𝐶’(𝑞𝑞) ≤ 0 (A.3) 0 ≤ 𝜆𝜆 ⊥ (𝑞𝑞 − 𝑄𝑄) ≤ 0. (A.4) 
The symbol ⊥ denotes orthogonality, which in the case of (A.3) is a more compact 
way of expressing the following complementarity relationship: 0 ≤ 𝑞𝑞,𝑆𝑆 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
𝑞𝑞 + 𝜆𝜆 − 𝐶𝐶’(𝑞𝑞) ≤ 0, 𝑞𝑞 �𝑆𝑆 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
𝑞𝑞 + 𝜆𝜆 − 𝐶𝐶’(𝑞𝑞)� = 0.  
Together, Conditions A.3 and A.4 form a set of complementarity conditions, or a 
complementarity problem. If there are also equality conditions, the problem is 
known as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). Gathering these conditions for 
all optimisation problems combined with all market clearing conditions (such as 
supply equals demand) in the gas market system forms a market equilibrium 
problem in the form of an MCP. The applications of the MCP f0r energy market 
modelling are numerous. Large-scale simulation models formulated as MCPs can be 
efficiently solved with commercial solvers such as PATH. 
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Appendix 3: Input data and assumptions of the global gas market model 
The model has been calibrated to simulate global gas trade for all major importing, 
exporting and producing regions. Table A.1 outlines countries and regions in the 
model. 
Table A.1: Market and production regions in the model. 
Market regions Production regions 
Region Countries Region Countries 
Nordic and 
Baltic 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Africa Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, 
Angola, Congo, 
Cote d'Ivoire, 
Gabon 
North-west 
Europe 
Germany, Netherlands 
Belgium, Luxembourg, 
France, UK, Rep. of Ireland 
Australia Australia, New Zealand 
Iberian 
Peninsula 
Spain, Portugal China China, Hong Kong 
Italy and 
Switzerland 
Italy, Switzerland Europe Denmark, Sweden, Norway, 
Germany, Netherlands, UK, 
Austria, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Italy, Ukraine 
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Austria, Czech Rep., Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland, 
India India, Pakistan 
South-east 
Europe and 
Balkans 
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovenia, Croatia, all former 
Yugoslav republics, Moldova 
Middle 
East 
Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, UAE 
Ukraine Ukraine Rest of 
Americas 
Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 
Venezuela 
Russia Russia, Belarus East Asia Bangladesh, Myanmar, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Brunei 
Turkey and 
South Caucasus 
Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan 
Central 
Asia 
Azerbaijan, Georgia,  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
China China, Hong Kong Russia Russia 
India India, Pakistan North 
America 
US, Canada, Mexico 
South-east Asia Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, 
Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Brunei, Bangladesh 
  
Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan 
(JKT) 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan   
Rest of Americas Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia,  
Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Peru 
  
Middle East Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Bahrain, Syria, Oman, Kuwait, 
Yemen, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran 
  
North America US, Canada, Mexico   
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Furthermore, we assume linear inverse demand functions, pm, for markets as follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 = 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 + 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚�𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕,𝑚𝑚
𝜕𝜕
, 
 
(A.5) 
where index m denotes the markets represented in the model and 𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕,𝑚𝑚 are the sales 
of producer p in market m. The price elasticity of the demand function is as follows: 
εc = −∂Q𝑚𝑚0∂p𝑚𝑚0 p𝑚𝑚0Q𝑚𝑚0  (A.6) 
Then, using (A.5) and noting that ∂Q𝑚𝑚
0
∂pm
0 = 1𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚, the parameters of the linear demand 
function are as follows: Am = − p𝑚𝑚0ε𝑚𝑚Qm0  and Bm = p𝑚𝑚0 �1 + 1ε𝑚𝑚� , (A.7) 
where p𝑚𝑚0  and Qm0  are reference price and consumption in markets m, respectively. 
These demand functions are specified at the assumed price elasticity of demand 
(PED) and average price–quantity pairs for 2010–2014 (Table A.2). 
 
Table A.2: Consumption, prices and elasticity of demand used for demand curve 
estimation. 
Region Consumption, 
bcm/year 
Price, 
$/tcm 
Long-run PED 
Nordic and Baltic 19 387 
-0.223 
North-west Europe 282 357 
Iberian Peninsula 37 436 
Italy and Switzerland 79 438 
Central and Eastern Europe 52 392 
South-east Europe and 
Balkans 
30 447 
Ukraine 52 336 
Russia 490 94 
Turkey and South Caucasus 58 439 
China 142 611 
India 94 598 
South-east Asia 173 610 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan 181 613 
Rest of Americas 158 601 
Middle East 411 74 
North America 873 141 
Source: Consumption comes from IEA, 2015a, prices come from the Bloomberg 
Terminal. 
 
Note that the assumed long-run PED for the model is the average of the estimated 
PED taken from the literature (see Table A.3 below). 
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Table A.3: Long-run and short-run PED. 
 
Long-run PED Short-run PED Region 
Bernstein and Madlener (2011) -0.16 -0.04 US 
Joutz et al. (2009) -0.18 -0.09 US 
Maddala et al. (1997) -0.273 -0.001 US 
Dahl (1993) -0.3 -0.3 US 
Bernstein and Griffin (2006) -0.36 -0.12 US 
Asche et al. (2008) -0.1 -0.03 EU 
Berkhout et al. (2004) -0.19 n/a EU 
Average -0.223 -0.10 
  
In terms of producers’ market power, we only consider that Russia and the Middle 
Eastern producers have the ability to affect prices by changing their sales strategies, 
reflecting their (i) vast gas resources and (ii) developed export capacity. However, 
since producers from these two regions are essentially government controlled, we 
also assume that they are price-takers in their respective ‘home’ markets. 
The model has been calibrated for 2010–2014 using the above consumption, prices 
and PED data. Note that the model reproduces the 2010–2014 data (market prices 
and consumption) reasonably well (see Table A.4) without any changes to the 
exogenous variables, such as changing PED and producers’ market power 
assumptions (see Chyong and Hobbs, 2014). This suggests that all input data for the 
model (capacities, supply curves, investment costs etc.) as well as its formulation 
appear to be correct. 
 
Table A.4: Consumption and prices: Model results vs 2010–2014 data. 
 Consumption, 
bcm/year 
Price, $/tcm 
 2010–
2014 
Model 2010–
2014 
Model 
Nordic and Baltic 19 17 387 528 
North-west Europe 282 274 357 403 
Iberian Peninsula 37 38 436 392 
Italy and Switzerland 79 78 438 458 
Central and Eastern Europe 52 50 392 450 
South-east Europe and Balkans 30 29 447 529 
Ukraine 52 50 336 384 
Russia 490 475 94 107 
Turkey and South Caucasus 58 55 439 539 
China 142 149 611 480 
India 94 98 598 502 
South-east Asia 173 178 610 533 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan 181 179 613 635 
Rest of Americas 158 171 601 372 
Middle East 411 418 74 68 
North America 873 939 141 93 
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To derive the demand curves for the rest of the modelling time horizon (2015–2035), 
we assume market demand and prices similar to those observed in 2010–2014. 
Implicitly, we assume no growth in gas consumption. While this is a conservative 
assumption, it guarantees that we do not overestimate the benefits of the ISTM sales 
strategy since, all else being equal, growth in demand would mean that the slope 
demand curves would be ‘flatter’ and, hence, sales under the market power 
assumption would result in higher profit. Furthermore, note that since the model has 
the capability to expand production and transport capacities endogenously, future 
clearing prices would be determined by a mix of factors, such as (i) supply costs 
(investment and operational production and transport costs), (ii) producers’ supply 
behaviour (price-taking vs price-making) and (iii) physical infrastructure 
bottlenecks. 
The long-run marginal production cost curves used in the model take the following 
functional form: 
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵, (A.4) 
where k is the cumulative development of gas reserves and A and B are the 
parameters to be estimated using data from the MIT gas study. 
The cost curves data for major gas producing regions are provided in MIT (2011). In 
this report, the cost curves were derived for two oil-price scenarios – low and high – 
reflecting uncertainty over the cost of oil and gas upstream development, which is 
highly depended on oil prices. In particular, the average oil price in 2004 was 
considered to fit a low-oil-price scenario, whereas the oil price in 2007 was taken as a 
high-oil-price scenario. This corresponds to oil prices of $38/bbl in 2004 and 
$73/bbl in 2007. Table A.5 provides the estimated parameters for the marginal cost 
curves in Eq. A.4 based on the MIT data. 
Table A.5: Estimated parameters for production cost curves. 
Region Low-oil-price scenario High-oil-price scenario 
 A B A B 
Africa 22.8701547 0.0001044 29.8205089 0.0001076 
Australia 52.7281116 0.000359 70.914024 0.0004098 
China 23.4258209 0.0005274 34.2321183 0.000517 
Europe 26.9195842 0.0001526 32.1785032 0.0001759 
India 12.3490103 0.0014732 17.4745555 0.0014858 
Middle East 8.8039929 0.0000287 17.7116173 0.0000245 
Rest of Americas 28.0009901 0.000097 38.9329627 0.0001074 
East Asia 16.5499778 0.0001632 24.360129 0.000117 
Central Asia 26.5270134 0.0001121 36.3271092 0.0001167 
Russia 13.9904275 0.000035 20.3362935 0.0000333 
North America 32.6513226 0.0000506 67.6024863 0.0000493 
Source: Author’s estimation based on data from MIT (2011). 
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We use the forward oil price curve as of mid August 2015 and input this curve into 
the model. This, in turn, determines the cost of developing gas resources. The 
forward curve takes the following specification:  
𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = � 102.066 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶 = 06.6967 ∗ 𝐶𝐶 + 52.37 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶 ≠ 0, (A.8) 
where t is the time period in the model, measured in five-year increments. The model 
starts with t=0, corresponding to the 2010–2014 time period. Thus, according to Eq. 
A.8, oil prices in 2015–2019 (t=1) are expected around $59.067/bbl, while for the 
reference period (2010–2014) the average oil price was very high, at $102.066/bbl. 
The price for long-term oil-indexed contracts is approximated using the following 
formula, as suggested by Stern and Rogers (2014): 
• oil-indexed contract price [$/mmbtu] = (0.666667 + 0.007619 * (average of 
previous nine months’ gas oil prices in $/tonne) + 0.008571 * (average of 
previous nine months’ fuel oil prices in $/tonne). 
Linear relationships exist between gas oil and fuel oil prices and the crude oil price 
(Brent). The estimated relationship is as follows: 
• gas oil price [$/tonne] = 8.5333 * (Brent oil price in $/bbl) + 5.3868 
• Fuel oil price [$/tonne] = 5.9347 * (Brent oil price in $/bbl) - 24.857 
The marginal cost curves will switch from low to high (Table A.5) if the expected oil 
price exceeds $73/bbl. The oil price is treated parametrically, and sensitivities 
around the ‘slope’ of the forward curve (Eq. A.8) are carried out to identify 
sensitivities of the results to oil price assumptions.  
Note that MIT’s data on cost curves include fields already in production. As such, we 
should calibrate these cost curves to take account of investment in gas resources that 
has already taken place (sunk investment). Failing to account for this sunk 
investment would result in overestimation of gas reserves. This may lead to double-
counting and, potentially, low equilibrium prices because the model will consider 
investment in gas resources from the very beginning of these cost curves, resulting in 
low investment costs. Thus, to circumvent this potential bias, we use the following 
procedure: 
1. The average annual production rate in the period 2010–2014 was used as the 
initial production capacity in the model (the production data were taken from 
IEA (2015a)). 
2. We then multiplied this production rate by twenty years, assuming that gas 
producers usually develop gas fields so as to sustain a targeted rate of 
production for about 20 years, corresponding to the useful lifetime of 
production and gas treatment assets in the upstream sector. Hence, the logic 
here is that since we observe the maximum production rate in the last five 
years, it is appropriate to assume that producers have already invested in the 
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development of gas reserves, the total size of which would allow them to 
sustain that production rate for 20 years. We use these derived total 
developed reserves as the starting point for the cost curves in the model (Table 
A.6 outlines the production capacities and developed reserves). 
Table A.6: Initial production capacity and developed reserves assumed in the model. 
Region 
Initial production 
rapacity, bcm/year 
Developed 
Reserves, bcm 
Africa 212 4235 
Australia 68 1,360 
China 111 2,223 
Europe 280 5,608 
India 70 1,404 
Middle East 553 11,060 
Rest of Americas 177 3,544 
East Asia 243 4,859 
Central Asia 201 4,025 
Russia 685 13,708 
North America 937 18,740 
 
Finally, in the modelling of gas markets, we take into account all existing long-term 
contracts (LTCs) for both LNG and pipeline gas. This is taken from Poten and 
Partners’ LNG contract database and other publically available sources, with the 
exception of producers from Russia, Europe (including Norway) and Africa. For 
these three regions, due to lack of information on producers’ long-term sales 
commitments, we take all export volumes in 2010–2014 from these regions to all 
markets and assume that these figures are representative of the annual contract 
quantity (ACQ) in their long-term supply commitments to various regional markets. 
Furthermore, we assume a minimum take-of-pay level of 75% of the defined ACQ 
(Table A.7), consistent with the academic view (e.g. Mitrova et al., 2015). 
 
Table A.7: ACQs from producers to consumers (bcm/year) 
 
Production 
region 
Market 2010–
2014 
2015–
2019 
2020–
2024 
2025–
2029 
2030–
2034 
2035–
2039 
Africa North-west 
Europe 
7.5 5.6 3.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 
Iberian 
Peninsula 
24.7 18.5 12.4 6.2 0.0 0.0 
Italy and 
Switzerland 
24.5 18.3 12.2 6.1 0.0 0.0 
South-east 
Europe and 
Balkans 
0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Turkey and 5.3 4.0 2.7 1.3 0.0 0.0 
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South 
Caucasus 
China 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 
India 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
South-east 
Asia 
0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Japan, 
Korea and 
Taiwan 
8.1 6.1 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Rest of 
Americas 
1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Middle 
East 
0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
North 
America 
2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Australia China 6.2 27.9 28.8 28.8 25.7 4.5 
India 0.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 
South-east 
Asia 
2.6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.0 0.0 
Japan, 
Korea and 
Taiwan 
28.1 68.2 68.9 56.0 46.9 16.6 
Europe Nordic and 
Baltic 
5.0 3.8 2.5 1.3 0.1 5.0 
North-west 
Europe 
181.6 136.2 90.8 45.4 1.8 181.6 
Iberian 
Peninsula 
3.8 2.8 1.9 0.9 0.0 3.8 
Italy and 
Switzerland 
13.8 10.4 6.9 3.5 0.1 13.8 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
11.3 8.5 5.7 2.8 0.1 11.3 
Middle East North-west 
Europe 
19.2 19.6 13.1 11.9 10.3 0.0 
Iberian 
Peninsula 
7.5 6.4 6.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 
Italy and 
Switzerland 
6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 1.3 0.0 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
0.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.0 
China 5.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 2.4 
India 10.2 10.2 10.2 8.8 0.7 0.0 
South-east 
Asia 
0.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.5 
Japan, 
Korea and 
Taiwan 
47.7 49.6 35.9 14.9 6.6 0.0 
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Rest of 
Americas 
Iberian 
Peninsula 
3.6 3.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
East Asia China 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 6.2 0.0 
Japan, 
Korea and 
Taiwan 
63.3 44.8 25.5 9.6 1.7 0.5 
Central Asia China 18.1 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Russia 
 
Nordic and 
Baltic 
8.3 7.9 7.2 5.8 5.0 4.2 
North-west 
Europe 
63.1 59.8 55.0 43.9 38.0 32.1 
Iberian 
Peninsula 
0.0 1.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Italy and 
Switzerland 
18.8 17.8 16.4 13.0 11.3 9.5 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
34.6 32.8 30.1 24.0 20.8 17.6 
South-east 
Europe and 
Balkans 
15.5 14.7 13.5 10.8 9.3 7.9 
Ukraine 30.9 30.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Turkey and 
South 
Caucasus 
26.9 25.5 23.4 18.7 16.2 13.6 
China 0.0 1.6 4.1 4.1 0.0 0.0 
Japan, 
Korea and 
Taiwan 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.3 0.0 
Rest of 
Americas 
2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 
Source: LNG contracts came from the Bloomberg Terminal; the rest were calculated 
based on IEA 2015a information. 
 
The remaining assumptions and data dealing with pipeline and LNG trade 
connections and capacities as well as associated short-run and long-run marginal 
costs are documented in our earlier paper (Chyong and Hobbs, 2014). 
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